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Abstract 
Bismarckian pension systems are usually depicted as path-dependent. Nonetheless, many 
formerly traditional Bismarckian systems shaped by public old-age provision have recently been 
reformed towards capital-funding and privatization, therefore paving the way for structural change 
usually not accounted for by path-dependency literature. However, the extent of those reforms 
varies drastically, even between relatively similar countries like Austria and Germany. Those very 
similar countries, previously organising their pension systems through a social insurance principle 
(Bismarckian pension systems), having the same welfare regime (conservative), being subject to 
demographic and budgetary pressure with roughly the same economic performance, have taken 
drastically different paths in the beginning of 21th century. This master thesis now aims to address 
this research puzzle through empirically assessing the power of ideas and discourse in explaining 
policy change. The main argument of this research is that policy actors and entrepreneurs in 
Germany were able to implement wide ranging reforms because they successfully handled the 
policy and political stream, framing communicative discourse until privatized, funded pension 
policies were seen as a cognitively and normatively acceptable solution, while their Austrian 
counterparts failed to do so. Methodologically, this master thesis tries to present evidence through 
a discourse analysis of 357 newspaper articles published during the specific reform periods in 
which privatization was considered as a policy alternative in Austria as well as Germany. 
Ultimately, evidence suggests that ideas and discourse can indeed make a difference. Not 
everything happens behind closed doors, even in corporatist, multi- actor systems. Policy 
entrepreneurs indeed act as discoursive actors and engage in communicative discourse to 
promote their favoured policy ideas. Pension reform in Germany involved a long and decisive 
framing process. In Austria, such an open attempt to frame communicative discourse towards 
privatization and capital funding was not visible. Ideas incompatible with the hegemonic discourse 
have had a hard standing because they were cognitively and normatively not accepted and 
provoked decisive action by opposing discoursive actors, suggesting that the framing process has 
to begin early enough and has to be coherent and consistent. Respectively, strong opposing 
discoursive actors can also defend the hegemonic discourse through quick and decisive action. 
Keywords: pension reform, pension privatization, discoursive institutionalism, communicative 
discourse, framing, policy ideas. 
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1.  Introduction 
In recent years, welfare states were subject to fundamental change. This especially holds true for 
pension systems. In general, pension reforms are often seen as policy responses to factors like 
demographic change, increased budgetary constraints or slow economic growth. What is stunning 
are the different kinds of policy reforms resulting. Regularly, not only in the public discussion, but 
also indirectly in some papers in the academic field of social policy (for example Busemeyer 2005), 
a reform towards a “funded” or privatized mode of pension financing is promoted, and many 
countries have already implemented such a pension reform.  What appears to be puzzling is the 
very different extent in which some very similar countries, all previously organising their pension 
systems through a social insurance principle (Bismarckian pension systems), having the same 
welfare regime (conservative), being subject to demographic and budgetary pressure with roughly 
the same economic performance, have introduced elements of funded or private pension schemes, 
often through introducing a system of multiple pension pillars.  
In this master thesis, the research puzzle shall be addressed that why very similar countries such 
as Austria and Germany differ significantly with respect to the extent in which they introduced 
elements of funded or private pension pillars, and therefore, initiated a structural change in their 
national pension system. More specifically, the research question of this master thesis addresses 
the role of ideas and discourse in explaining such policy changes: How do policy ideas and 
discourses influence the (pension) policy to be implemented in very similar contexts like Austria 
and Germany? Therefore, the main hypothesis of this research is that the differences in pension 
reforms result from the varying success of policy entrepreneurs to frame public discussion and 
discourses about pension policy in order to make private and funded pension systems a 
normatively accepted way of old age provision.  This argument is mainly based on the assumption 
that policy discourses and ideas, defined as concrete policies as well as “organized principles and 
causal beliefs”, can help explaining policy reform (Béland 2005: 2). The hypothesis will be tested 
through a comparative critical discourse analysis of newspaper articles concerning pension reform 
in Austria and Germany between 1998 and 2002. However, the aim of this thesis is not to assess 
those reforms implemented according to their necessity, adequacy, financial sustainability or 
effects on social inequality, but rather to analyse how discoursive actors influenced the national 
policy discussion in favour of their reform ideas of privatization and capital-funding.  
Chapter 2 will establish the cases used in this research project. First, an overview of the different 
historical and technical properties of pension systems will be given, lining out important concepts 
and definitions. Afterwards, the specific policies concerning privatization and capital-funding 
introduced in Austria and Germany will be lined out in more detail. Those familiar with the design of 
Bismarckian pension systems and pension reform in Austria and Germany can skip chapter 2.1 to 
2.3. In chapter 2.4, based on secondary literature, the differences in the extent in which Germany 
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and Austria implemented privatization and capital-funding in their pension systems in the early 
2000s will be lined out. Chapter 3 constitutes a literature review and explores possible existing 
explanations for such a divergence of the reform paths, coming to the conclusion that the different 
extent in the pension reforms towards privatization and capital-funding between countries which 
previously organized their pension system through a social insurance principle (Bismarckian 
pension systems) cannot be explained by conventional social policy theory. Therefore, the 
possibility to explain those reform differences by a rather new theory strand in social policy will be 
highlighted, namely the theory strand about the power of ideas and discourse.  
Chapter 4 then constitutes the theoretical and methodological section of this paper. Chapter 4.1 
presents the theoretical foundations of this master thesis, referring to theories from Kingdon 
(2001), Béland (2005), Schmidt (2002, 2005, 2008) and Brettschneider (2009). Discourse is here 
defined as the “sum of policy and political actors’ accounts of a policy programmes purpose, 
objectives, and ideals which serve as a guide to action by defining the concepts and norms to be 
applied, identifying the problems to be solved, explaining the methods to be followed, developing 
the policy instruments to be used, […] framing the national policy discussion“ (Schmidt 2002: 214). 
Discourses are influenced by ideas and influence ideas, which can take the form of specific 
proposed policies, policy paradigms or their underpinning “deeper” worldviews (Schmidt 2008: 
306). In other words, discourse also captures political actors’ understandings of social policy 
reform, the ways in which those actors try to argue in favour of their policy ideas and how they 
frame those ideas in order to influence the public as well as their (political or intellectual) 
competition. Chapters 4.2 shows how those theoretical foundations can be transferred to an 
empirical research setting, lining out the main hypothesis as well as the research design. This 
paper of course aims to add additional explanatory arguments (discourse) into the discussion of 
pension and welfare state reform in general. Chapter 4.3 goes into detail how the data was 
collected and how relevant articles were filtered out. Chapter 5 finally constitutes the empirical 
section of this paper and constitutes a structural analysis of overall 357 newspaper articles. 
Chapter 5.1 and 5.2 are the respective country chapters for Austria and Germany, while 5.3 lines 
out further comparative evidence between the two discourse strands analysed. In detail, it will be 
argued that German policy actors were indeed more successful in framing the public discussion on 
pension reform, and that this was the case because they started their framing process early 
enough, they used their discoursive strategies consistently and coherently and because there were 
nearly no opposing discoursive actors present in the discourse. The thesis will finally end with 
some conclusive remarks and suggestions. 
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2.  Paradigm change in Bismarckian pension systems? Establishing the 
cases 
2.1.  The diversity of pension systems  
Pension systems have varied drastically in different countries as well as over time. Important 
categories for analysing and categorizing pension systems are so-called “pillars” and “tiers”. The 
usage and meaning of those terms varies drastically in the literature. Throughout this thesis, the 
definition of Ebbinghaus (2011) will be used, who makes a clear distinction between tiers and 
pillars. Pension pillars are distinguished by their providers, which can either be the state (first 
pillar), the employer (second pillar), or the individual (via individual contracts with private pension 
funds; third pillar). Correspondingly, the second and third pillar can be considered as private 
pension pillars, while the first pillar is public. However, three tiers distinguish between the basic 
functions of a pension system. While the first tier is responsible for granting a minimum income for 
needy pensioners or a universal basic income for everybody, the second tier should preserve one’s 
income standard when entering retirement. Finally, the third tier only acts as some sort of bonus, 
“topping-up” one’s retirement income. While the first tier is usually part of the first pillar (the state), 
the second and third tier can (theoretically) be found in all pension pillars.   
This distinction has to be presented in a historical and ideological context. Originally, the World 
Bank promoted reform of pension systems towards a system of three tiers in which the first tier is 
publicly managed while all other functions (the second and the third tier) were supposed to be fully 
funded and privately managed – a strategy that became highly controversial as time went by, 
especially in the light of the financial crisis (cf. Stiglitz/Orszag 1999: 2, Schmähl 2000). In practice, 
this would have meant a far reaching structural change towards privatization, especially in 
Bismarckian pension systems. Historically, different kinds of pension systems emerged in 
industrialized countries, with different “public-private mixes” according to the design of its tiers as 
well as pillars. Roughly, pension systems can be ordered into two groups. The first one, often 
called the Bismarckian (Myles/Pierson 2001: 316) or social insurance pension system (Bonoli 
2003: 400), is usually shaped by one single public pension scheme, financed through a pay-as-
you-go system. This means that current workers finance the current generation of pensioners, 
therefore creating an “intergenerational contract”.  Typical countries with a Bismarckian pension 
system are Austria and Germany. The benefits granted are usually dependent on contributions 
during employment and therefore the former level of income, as well as the total time employed 
(following the “equivalence principle”). Ultimately, the strategy of the Bismarckian system aims at 
income replacement and status maintenance for retirement. Other means to make provisions for 
one’s retirement were usually not necessary in countries with Bismarckian pension systems. In 
order to avoid poverty for individuals who were not able to acquire sufficient benefit rights during 
their employment, some sort of minimum, means-tested pension was usually granted. However, 
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there is often no distinction between the first and the second tier possible in Bismarckian pension 
systems, as both functions are in the responsibility of the state and often combined in one single 
scheme (Bonoli 2003: 400). 
The Bismarckian system stands in contrast to a Beveridge-type pension system. Such pension 
systems have historically emerged as programmes only for the elderly-poor, in order to eradicate 
old age poverty while not acting as an instrument of income replacement (Myles/Pierson 2001: 
316). Typically, states with a Beveridge-type pension systems introduced second tiers which 
granted income-related benefits through pay-as-you-go financing much later, while some other 
countries never did. Therefore, the second tier is also often funded and/or private (ib.: 316).  
However, this historical distinction between Bismarckian and Beveridge (or multipillar) pension 
systems is increasingly eroding. Especially the early 2000s marked a period of high pension reform 
activity, for example in Austria and Germany, in both countries conducted by newly elected 
governments. As already outlined, a reform towards a “funded” and privatized mode of pension 
financing was publicly often promoted and was de facto mainstream opinion. However, there were 
already expert opinions, now also increasingly in the World Bank, which highlighted the dangers 
resting upon such a restructuring (for example Stiglitz/Orszag 1999, Schmähl 2000). Nonetheless 
many countries attempted to implement reforms aiming for structural change towards privatization, 
also in Austria and Germany. In Austria, a centre-right government wanted to introduce a pension 
reform based on a “model of 3 pillars” (i.e. multipillar) in the early 2000s. In addition to the old, pay-
as-you-go financed pillar, two additional pillars should have been reinforced, namely an employer-
based pillar and a private-based pillar. However, many of the planned aspects of the reform were 
cancelled. The state’s role in the pension system remained still distinct. In contrast, in Germany, 
the 2001 reform marked the start of a strong subsidization of occupational as well as individual 
private pensions, with significant long-run cutbacks in the public, state-funded pillar (Meyer 2015: 
192). Those reforms will be outlined in more detail in the next chapter, therefore establishing the 
cases used in this research project.  
2.2.  Germany  
2.2.1.  German pension politics in a historical perspective 
Like Austria, Germany has a Bismarckian pension system, shaped by a strong pay-as-you-go first 
pillar with the purpose of providing a constantly adequate, earnings related income for the elderly. 
Therefore, the scheme is administrated by self-governing bodies supervised by the state and 
financed by contributions which are split in half between employers and employees and by 
transfers from the federal government (Schludi 2005: 130). Second and third pillar pension existed 
already in the 20th century, but were not very important. For example, occupational pensions were 
only seen as a supplement for high wage earners and financed only by employers in order to bind 
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qualified employees and as a measure of self-financing (Ebbinghaus/Gronwald/Wiß 2011: 130). 
Treated as liabilities due to their book reserve nature, such schemes became increasingly 
unattractive in the process of financial market development and the importance of shareholder 
value (ib.: 130). Rising non-wage labour costs lowered the attractiveness of those schemes, and 
increasing unemployment in Germany made the binding of qualified employees less relevant 
(Schmähl 2004: 158).  Therefore, the 90s are generally seen as an age of diminishing importance 
of occupational pensions schemes.  
Consistent with the theory of blame avoidance, pension politics were generally a field of 
consensual policy making in Germany, with all major parties and social partners traditionally 
backing reforms of the system (Wiß 2011: 134; Schludi 2005: 132). Since 1977, the pension 
system was frequently subject to benefit cuts in order to stabilize contribution rates, which became 
a major issue in German pension politics as the contribution rate was projected to reach 36 percent 
in 2030 (Schludi 2005: 130f.) The results were falling pension spendings until 1992 (Schludi 2005: 
130). Stabilizing contribution rates below 20 percent was also the main target of the first wide 
ranging reform in 1992, but all measures targeted a reform within the existing system, for example 
raising the retirement age or increasing the federal subsidy of the system (Schludi 2005: 134). 
Financial institutions are naturally favourable towards private and funded pension schemes (ib.: 
171). In general, employers also have an incentive to demand cutbacks in the public pension 
systems in order to reduce their labour costs (Schmähl 2004: 171). Privatization was not yet on the 
table, but employer representatives already announced their wish for higher shares of private 
forms of pension provision (Wiß 2011: 134f.).  
The costs of German unification, raising the contribution rate from 17.5 to 20.3 percent in 1997, 
quickly placed another reform of the pension system on the political agenda, ultimately resulting 
the in pension reform of 1999, which was decided by the conservative liberal government of Kohl in 
1997 and trigged massive protest form the opposition and trade unions (Schludi 2005: 134f.; Wiß 
2011:  143). The “Bündnis für Arbeit”, a tripartite committee between trade unions, employer 
representatives and state representatives broke down as the government decided to implement 
tighter eligibility criteria for disability pensions and the reduction of the standard pension level from 
70 to 64 percent through a demographic factor (Schludi 2005, Wiß 2011: 143-150). Much like in 
1992, the reform did not constitute drastic change of the existing pension system, but rather a 
change within the system. In the government, the “traditionalists” led by labour minister Blüm 
prevailed, but voices from the business wing of the Christian Democratic CDU and employer 
representatives favouring more private ways of old age provision as well as capital funding were 
much louder than in 1992 (Schludi 2005: 139-144; Wiß 2011: 145). 
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2.2.2.  Private provision as a new paradigm in German pension politics 
The social democrats made the reform a major issue in the elections of 1998, promising to abolish 
it if elected for government. Ultimately, the social democrats won the elections, formed a coalition 
with the green party, and indeed cancelled the demographic factor and the reform of disability 
pensions (Schludi 2005: 145). In order to stabilize the contribution rate and gain time for a more 
comprehensive reform, the government increased the federal subsidy of the pension system again 
(Wiß 2011: 150). Already in 1999, a first draft of a new reform was published (ib.: 153). One of the 
major goal of the 2001 reform was, much like in earlier reforms, to ease the financial burdens of 
the first public pillar, also because high non-wage labour costs were considered as a major 
problem for the German economy (Busemeyer 2005: 573). But in contrast to previous reforms 
within the existing system, a complete redesign of the pension system was now aimed at. With 
labour minister Walter Riester, former second chairman at the trade union IG Metal, a now 
dedicated “modernizer” was favoured over the long-serving social policy speaker of the social 
democratic party, Dreßler (Schludi 2005: 147; Wiß 2011: 125). It was stated that the first pillar 
should hereafter only constitute a “basic pension”, while no longer ensuring the previous living 
standard – this was now considered to be the purpose of the redesigned second and third pillars. 
As already mentioned, those pillars existed before the reform, with second and third pillar 
accounting for each 10 percent of overall pension expenditure (Busemeyer 2005: 330, 573; 
Schmähl 2007: 320ff., 325).  
The first drafts proposed a means-tested basic income for the elderly within the first pillar1, and a 
mandatory privately funded third pillar pension accounting for 2.5 percent of gross earnings 
(Schludi 2005: 148f). Especially as this proposal was constructed internally in the ministry without 
much external involvement, opposition to it was manifold, with large shares of the government 
parties and all trade unions except IG BCE (mining, chemicals and energy) favouring a 
traditionalist reform within the existing first pillar (Wiß 2011: 153-156). Additionally, the mandatory 
aspects were seen as very problematic by the opposition and large parts of the coalition (Wiß 
2011: 164f.). Ultimately, the largely traditionalist trade unions were not able to prevent privatization, 
but mainly due to lobbying activities by IG BCE, the main focus of the government was shifted from 
third pillar towards collectively agreed second pillar pensions, which grants trade unions in general 
more influence due to the specific nature of the reform (cf. Wiß 2011: 166-170).  
In the final reform, the means-tested basic income for the elderly was not included anymore and 
replaced by a means-tested transfer payment in case of insufficient income for the elderly, similar 
to previous social assistance for pensioners, but without potential costs for the children of the 
                                               
1 Germany previously had no real minimum pension, but pensioners were also eligible for means-tested social 
assistance if their household income falls below a certain level (Schmähl 2004: 161).  
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respective pensioners (Grundsicherung im Alter) (Schludi 2005: 157; Busemeyer 2005: 574; 
Schmähl 2004: 161f.). Second, every employee was granted the right to transfer a certain share of 
his or her income into an occupational pension scheme (Entgeldumwandlung) (Wiß 2011: 191ff.). 
The conditions of those schemes were subject to collective agreements and therefore under the 
influence of trade unions (Tarifvorbehalt) (ib.: 194). Obligatory elements were not implemented, but 
instead the 2001 reform marked the start of a strong subsidization of occupational as well as 
individual private pensions. Through the so-called Eichel relief, contributions to occupational 
pension schemes were exempt from tax and any social insurance contributions (but subject to 
deferred taxation) for up to 4 percent of the upper earnings limits, which constituted 200 percent of 
average gross earnings in 2003 (Wiß 2011: 165; Schmähl 2004: 184). In the third pillar, the so-
called “Riester-Rente” (Riester-Pension) was introduced, named after the Minister of Social Affairs. 
Basically, the “Riester-Rente” was a heavy subsidy for fully capital-funded pension schemes, 
consisting of direct subsidies or tax exemptions. Those become due if an individual “invests a 
certain share of gross income in certified investment products” (Busemeyer 2005: 573). The criteria 
for those products include the necessity of regular savings into the product as well as the 
prohibition of lump-sum payments (Schmähl 2004: 185).  Subsidies can be quite significant as 
Busemeyer outlined. They are by 2008 granted for up to 4 percent of gross wages contributed to 
an investment product (starting at 1 percent in 2001), reaching up to 50 percent of individual third 
pillar pension savings for individuals with low income (Busemeyer 2005: 573; Meyer/Bridgen 2014: 
42). Additional subsidies are granted in Riester contracts per child (Schmähl 2004: 186). 
It was also possible to use the Riester subsidy in the occupational pillar, allowing to choose 
between Eichel or Riester plans (Wiß 2011:.160). While Riester plans generally favoured 
individuals with lower income, Eichel plans were better for individuals with higher earnings (Wiß 
2011: 200). In 2004, the re-elected red-green government supplemented those two plans by similar 
Rürup plans with tax privileges, allowing the self-employed to also make use of the third pillar (Wiß 
2011: 191-193). 
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Table 1: Subsidy in case of a private certified pension contract 
  Transfer payment  
Year Required 
contribution 
rate as 
percentage of 
earnings 
Basic payment 
for adult 
persons 
Additional 
payment 
per child 
Exemption from 
income tax base 
(Maximum) 
  Euros per year  
2002 and 2003 1 38 46 525 
2004 and 2005 2 76 92 1050 
2006 and 2007 3 114 138 1575 
2008 and later 4 154 185 2100 
Note: Reproduced from Paradigm shift in German pension policy: measures aiming at a new public-private 
mix and their effects (p. 186) by W. Schmähl, 2004. Northampton, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.  
 
All those plans also constitute a shift away from pay-as-you-go towards capital funding in 
Germany. In the occupational pillar, the Eichel subsidy is only granted for capital funded 
occupational pension schemes (Wiß 2011: 200). In Germany, there existed 4 types or 
implementation channels (Durchführungswege) of occupational pensions up to the reform of 2001, 
with only 2 of them being managed through external institutions and allowing for a certain amount 
of stocks (Pensionskassen and Direktversicherungen) (Wiß 2011: 202). The amount of stocks is 
then again capped to a maximum of 35 percent because those implementation channels are 
regarded as an insurance (ib.: 202). In order to allow for riskier and flexible investments and 
therefore theoretically higher interest rates, a new implementation channel was introduced in the 
reform of 2001, called pension funds (Pensionsfonds) (ib.: 191). Eichel plans were consequently 
usable in the capital funded Pensionskassen, Direktversicherungen and Pensionsfonds. As those 
plans are voluntary, externally managed and often only financed through contributions from the 
employee2, the occupational pillar is now also highly individualized, with the employer more or less 
being only an intermediary between the individual and the financial institutions. Nonetheless, the 
plans are still subject to collective agreements. Ultimately, collective agreements for example can 
(but do not have to) determine the split between employer and employee contributions or the 
implementation channel (Ebbinghaus/Gronwald/Wiß 2011: 140ff.).   
As Schmähl outlines, the reform was based on the principle of the “carrot and the stick”. As the 
public first pillar was retrenched, people somehow had to compensate their loss in pension benefits 
                                               
2 39 percent of all employers who use Pensionskassen, 46 percent of all employers who use Pensionsfonds and 68 
percent of all employers who use Direktversicherungen do not contribute to their employee’s occupational pension plans 
(Wiß 2011: 199). 
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(the stick), while the subsidization of the third pillar and second pillar (the carrot) creates incentives 
to use voluntary pension pillars (Schmähl 2007: 324). According to Ziegelmeyer and Nick, the 
coverage rate of the introduced Riester contracts reached more than 37 percent of all persons 
eligible in 2011 (Ziegelmeyer/Nick 2013: 506), while occupational pensions increased from 14 to 
around 19 million employees, constituting a coverage rate around 65 to 70 percent (Wiß 2011: 
194). Moreover, people were now officially expected to make use of those voluntary second and 
third pillar pensions. First pillar pensions were now permanently linked to a hypothetical 
contribution rate of the second and third pillar through a highly complicated formula. The higher this 
contribution rate, the higher are the cutbacks in first pillar benefits. This contribution rate is not 
empirically observed, but rather a fixed rate of individual income the government has chosen to 
grant subsidies to, starting from 0.5 percent of individual income in 2002 to 4 percent in 2008 
(Schmähl 2007: 327). It does not matter for the calculation of the cutbacks if the population actually 
makes use of those subsidies (on average reaching the hypothetical contribution rate). This led to 
the grotesque situation where current pensioners who were never able to make use of the 
reformed private pillars were subject to pension cuts due to a fictively higher coverage rate of 
private pensions (Wiß 2011: 201f.). After the pension reform of 2001 and consequent elections, the 
newly re-elected red-green government again initiated a pension reform in 2004, which introduced 
more pension cutbacks, for example through a sustainability factor adjustment, but did not further 
deepen privatization (except from the already mentioned and only marginally important Rürup 
pensions) (Wiß 2011: 170ff.).  
2.3.  Austria  
2.3.1.  Austrian pension politics in a historical perspective 
As a Bismarckian pension system, the Austrian system of old age provision is also shaped by a 
strong public pay-as-you-go pillar with the goal of income replacement. However, it has to be noted 
that the link between contributions and benefits is much weaker in Austria than in Germany, 
resulting in generally more generous benefits (Schludi 2005: 165). This first pillar is run by statutory 
self-governing pension insurance organizations and financed in part by employer and employee 
contributions with deficits covered by government expenditures (Schulze/Schludi 2007: 567; 
Schludi 2005: 166). Like in Germany, due to the generosity of the first pillar, occupational and 
private pensions were traditionally of relatively minor importance in Austria. Consensus between 
the government parties as well as the social partners was also traditionally the main mode of 
pension politics in Austria (ib.: 167). Rising financial problems of the scheme were tackled since 
the 1980s mainly through expenditure cuts, with pension costs and contribution rates as well as 
state subsidies stabilizing around 1985 (Schludi 2005: 167). The Christian 
Democratic/conservative ÖVP articulated demands for an increasing role of private pension 
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provision already in 1990, resulting in a reform of occupational pensions (Obinger/Tálos 2006: 86). 
In addition to internal direct pension commitments and external group life insurances, external 
Pensionskassen were introduced3 (Url 2003: 65). The latter two both allowed for a certain amount 
of stocks, 30 and 50 percent respectively4 (Mum/Klec 2006: 119, 121). The newly introduced 
implementation channel was relatively successful, as more than 50 percent of all occupational 
pensions were at least partly financed via Pensionskassen in 1993 (Url 2003: 65).  
In the beginning of the 1990s, a worsening budgetary situation of the pension system in the face of 
the European Monetary Union criteria and rising unemployment triggered new reforms, and public 
debate got increasingly heated (Schludi 2005: 168f.). As a first break in the traditional pattern of 
pension politics, social partners were initially not included in the construction of the budgetary 
emergency steps concerning the pension system in 1994 (ib.: 169). Throughout the decade, 
pension politics were shaped by demands for expenditure cuts (especially via raising the 
retirement age) by the ÖVP, while the SPÖ generally presented itself as a defender of the welfare 
state and against pension cuts (ib.: 171-173). After several budgetary emergency steps which 
reduced the generosity of the pension system, an expert commission under German pension 
advisor Bert Rürup proposed yearly adjustments through a demographic factor, an increase in 
women’s retirement age, a strengthening of actuarial “fairness” as well as strengthening of the 
second and third pillar (Schludi 2005: 175; Schulze/Schludi 2007: 584). The government’s draft 
proposed mainly other, but not less controversial steps, ultimately resulting in fierce resistance by 
the trade unions and a more modest reform in 1997 which limited benefit cuts to 7 percent and also 
included some expansionary measures like credits for child rearing (Schludi 2005: 174-188). One 
of last measures of the SPÖ/ÖVP government concerning pension reform was the introduction of 
the Prämienbegünstigte Pensionsvorsorge, which included subsidized individual private pension 
saving plans (Pensionszusatzversicherung, Pensionsinvestmentfonds) as well as subsidized 
additional voluntary insurance possible in the public as well as the occupational pillar (Url 2004: 37; 
Url 2011: 24, 45). Only rather low contributions can be paid in this supplementary insurance, and 
the availability of the occupational pillar is still dependent on employer’s decisions (cf. Url 2011: 
24).  All of those options necessitate a lifelong commitment and pay-out as an annuity, therefore it 
is only possible to suspend payments, but earlier access is not allowed (Url 2004: 37). Maybe also 
due to those strict rulings, those products were never popular and did not spread much (ib.: 41).  
Discussion about reform remained heated in the elections of 1999. The ÖVP, placed third in the 
elections after the populist radical right freedom party (FPÖ), made a raise of the retirement age 
                                               
3 Two additional options exist: voluntary supplementary insurance in the public pillar and Unterstützungskassen. Both are 
of minor importance in Austria (Scholz 2006: 85; Url 2003: 65). 
4 The cap for Pensionskassen had to be raised to 70 percent in 2005 for products without a guaranteed rate of return due 
to the European Union’s Pension Fund Directive. 
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conditional for engaging in a government coalition and already pushed for the incremental 
privatization of the pension system (Schludi 2005: 177; Schulze/Schludi 2007: 587). The coalition 
agreement between the SPÖ and the ÖVP triggered protest in the trade unions as well as within 
the SPÖ, and ultimately the ÖVP broke the long-lasting Austrian tradition of grand coalitions and 
formed a right-wing coalition with the FPÖ (Schludi 2005: 177). 
2.3.2.  Reform with limited privatization 
The goal to reform the existing pension system towards a “model of 3 pillars” was already stated in 
the coalition agreement of the centre-right government in the early 2000s (Obinger/Tálos 2006: 
87f.; Schulze/Schludi 2007: 588). In addition to the old, pay-as-you-go financed pillar, the two 
additional pillars should have been reinforced. Social partners were from there on no more the 
dominant force in the construction of pension reforms under the ÖVP/FPÖ government, with 
apparently independent experts playing a larger role (Schludi 2005: 178ff.). The main features of 
the first pension reform of the newly elected government in 2000 included an increase in the early 
retirement age as well as the retirement age for civil servants, greater penalties for early 
retirement, abolition of early retirement due to disability as well as cuts of widow pensions 
(Schulze/Schludi 2007: 588ff.; Schludi 2005: 178). In contrast to earlier reforms, cuts were more 
substantial and went into effect nearly immediately – a measure justified by a zero budget policy 
(Obinger/Tálos 2006: 88; Schulze/Schludi 588). This reform was ultimately decided against fierce 
resistance of social partners like the trade unions and the worker’s chamber (Schludi 2005: 178ff.). 
The consensual nature of pension politics in Austria therefore finally came to an end. 
Privatization was carried out later in 2 separate laws. Austrian occupational pensions existed 
already previously, as outlined earlier. However, only 16 percent of the dependently employed 
were eligible to those pensions (Url 2003: 67). In contrast to Germany, the reform did not touch 
those old elements of the employer-based pillar, but rather changed severance pay legislation 
(Abfertigung neu) (Steiner 2013: 280ff.). Only 15 percent of all terminated work contracts were 
eligible for severance pay in the old legislation (Obinger/Tálos 2006: 91). The old scheme 
amounted for 2 to 12 months of salary for an employee, varying according to the length the 
employment relationship (Obinger/Tálos 2006: 91; Schludi 2005: 181). The criteria necessitated an 
employment relationship of at least 3 years as well as a one-sided termination of the contract by 
the employer or mutual termination (Obinger/Tálos 2006: 91). Severance pay was handled 
internally in the individual employer’s accounts, amounting for at least half of all entitlements which 
might fall due (Schludi 2005: 181). A reform of the system towards external capital-funding was 
already in talks by the SPÖ/ÖVP coalition, while the ÖVP favoured a transformation of the system 
towards pension provision (ib.:91). 
In contrast to the pension reform of 2000, social partners were included in the construction of the 
reform (Schludi 2005: 182). Ultimately, the new severance pay legislation passed parliament with 
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the agreement of all parties in June 2002 and now covered all newly signed employment contracts 
with no eligibility criteria (Schludi 2005: 181; Steiner 2013: 282; Obinger/Tálos 2006: 92). 1.53 
percent of an employee’s wage are now saved in and external fund, named 
Mitarbeitervorsorgekasse (employee provision fund) (Schludi 2005.: 181; Obinger/Tálos 2006: 92). 
If the employment contract is terminated (regardless of the old criteria), the employee can either 
choose to get a full pay-out5 or leave the money in the fund as a tax-free annuity for old age 
provision (Schludi 2005: 181.). Originally, a complete replacement of the severance pay option in 
favour of occupational pensions was planned, but given up due to protests by the social partners 
(Blank et al. 2016a: 10). According to Wöss, this optionality stands in contrast to the conception of 
an employer based pension pillar (Wöss 2002: 428). This position was also held by the opposition 
parties agreeing to the reform, as for example the Green party stated that the reform does not 
constitute any second pillar of pension provision (Tálos/Obinger 2006: 93). On the other side, 
authors like Obinger and Tálos (2006: 98) argue that the reform may not have formally, but de 
facto contributed towards a stronger occupational pillar. The labelling of the funds handling the 
severance pay reserves as employee provision funds may also have a psychological impact on the 
decisions of individuals on whether to choose a pay-out or an annuity. However, the monthly 
contributions to those new funds are rather low considering that it was labelled a second pillar of 
pension provision by the government (Obinger/Tálos 2006: 92). Also the fact that the employee 
can choose the pay-out at situations which are generally shaped by financial hardship is also most 
likely influencing individual preferences against choosing the annuity.  
After the second pillar had been, at least according to the government’s judgement, reformed and 
strengthened, establishing a third pillar was scheduled next. This was carried out within the scope 
of a thematically totally unrelated emergency compensation package for victims of the 2002 
flooding in Austria which passed parliament in September 2002 (Obinger/Tálos 2006: 93). New 
subsidized individual private saving plans were introduced (Prämienbegünstigte Zukunftsvorsorge), 
which replaced the old unpopular plans previously introduced by the SPÖ/ÖVP government (Url 
2004: 41). Savings are bound for 10 years; earlier access necessitates the repayment of the 
subsidy (ib.: 44). To be eligible for those subsidies, at least 40 percent6 of the money saved in 
those respective products has to be invested in stocks, which makes them relatively risky, while at 
least a 0 percent interest rate has to be guaranteed by the financial provider (ib.: 44). In 2004, 
already 470.000 new contracts were signed (Obinger/Tálos 2006: 93). The coverage rate of this 
new way of pension provision was around 27 percent of the working age population in 2009 (Url 
2011: 42.). Subsidies are variable and amount between 8.5 to 13 percent7 of the total upper 
                                               
5 This pay-out is significantly lower than in the old scheme (Schludi 2005: 182). 
6 Originally, even 60% were provided for by law. 
7 Depending on the current subsidy of another subsidized savings instrument in Austria (Bausparvertrag) (Url 2004: 44).  
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savings limit of around EUR 2000 per year in 2005 (Obinger/Tálos 2006: 93). The upper limit is 
indexed and rises together with the upper earnings limits for social insurance (Url 2011: 46). 
Furthermore, it has to be noted that money saved through that scheme is not necessarily used as 
a pension (annuity), as customers can also choose a pay-out with half of the original premium at 
the end of the contract (Url 2004: 46). Not surprisingly, all parliamentary parties agreed to the 
emergency compensation package for flooding victims, despite criticism for this new form of old-
age provision (Obinger/Tálos 2006: 94).  
After snap elections in 2002, which resulted again in a government between the FPÖ and the ÖVP, 
the government imposed two consequent major pension reforms after 2002. First and foremost, 
those reforms were shaped by pension cuts (as well as a few expansionary measures), 
harmonisation, increased transparency and administrative measures (Obinger/Tálos 2006: 89-97). 
According to Tálos and Obinger, the individual loss of pension payments could reach a peak of 30 
percent, but due to protest from the social partners, unions, the opposition and finally also within 
the FPÖ, the loss regarding pension payments was limited to 5 to 10 percent (Obinger/ Tálos 
2006: 91, Steiner 2013: 284). Without this cap on pension cuts, the effects on current as well as 
future pensioners would have been severe. Also due to this cap on pension cuts, the reforms 
generally did not move the pension system towards further privatizations, and will therefore not be 
subject to this analysis. However, it has to be noted that some of the cutbacks were justified with 
the availability of the previously introduced private plans for old age provision (Abfertigung neu, 
Prämienbegünstigte Zukunftsvorsorge) (Obinger/Tálos 2006: 90).  
2.4.  Pension privatization in a comparative perspective 
In the literature, there is consensus that the German reform is far reaching, as retrenchment 
combined with subsidization led the German pension system into structural change (cf. Schmähl 
2004, 2007; Busemeyer 2005). Overall, while Tálos and Obinger argue that with the pension 
reforms in Austria, elements of de-commodification were reduced, linking the pension system more 
individually to the wage-level, the state’s role in the pension system still remained distinct.  
(Tálos/Obinger 2006: 89; Dirninger 2013: 251). Busemeyer comes to conclusion that the reform in 
Austria led to no structural change in the countries pension system, with elements of private 
pension schemes remaining limited (Busemeyer 2005: 576). The Austrian pension system 
continued to provide a much higher replacement rate than the German one, even after relatively 
high short-run cutbacks (Busemeyer 2005: 576, OECD 2013: 137). In contrast, in Germany, the 
2001 reform marked the start of a strong subsidization of occupational as well as individual private 
pensions, with significant long-run cutbacks in the public, state-funded pillar (Meyer 2015: 192). A 
new report by Blank et al. (2016a) comes to a similar conclusion. 
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The difference of the pension systems’ structure after the reforms can be seen in the design of the 
respective policies as well as in the coverage rate. Regarding second pillar reform, the German 
reform is far more wide-reaching than its Austrian counterpart. The Austrian severance pay 
legislation is admittedly mandatory, but as the name suggests, still a severance pay scheme - at 
best a hybrid system between severance pay and pension provision. While factors like the naming 
of the severance pay funds as employee provision funds may influence employees’ decisions to 
choose the annuity option, the possibility to access the savings when losing one’s job and 
therefore in times of unemployment suggests otherwise. In contrast, the German system offers the 
right for occupational pension provision as well as a variety of subsidies and tax exemptions which 
create heavy incentives to make use of the voluntary occupational pillar. 
Concerning private individual savings (and therefore a so called “third pillar), German Riester plans 
and their Austrian counterparts are quite distinct concerning their generosity. While the highest 
amounts of granted subsidies were roughly equivalent in Austria and Germany, German savers are 
granted a much higher subsidy relative to the amount of savings they have invested. For example, 
considering a yearly wage of 30.000 Euros, where the maximum amount (4 percent) of earnings is 
saved in a Riester account, this leads to yearly total savings of 1200 euro and a premium of 154 
euros. Considering the same amount of yearly savings for an Austrian individual, the premium is 
around 1/3 lower. This tendency is even stronger for lower incomes than in the example, and the 
possibility for tax exemption which is especially beneficial for higher incomes does not exist in 
Austria. Furthermore, for every child, additionally up to 185 euros of subsidies a year are granted in 
Riester contracts (Schmähl 2004: 186). 
It is very hard to find internationally comparable data about the coverage of the second and third 
pillar, let alone data comparable over time. Nonetheless, the information available always points in 
the same direction. De Deken assesses private pension provision in Germany to be more 
developed than in Austria (De Deken 2013: 280f.). And all OECD reports of the last years 
containing internationally (but not intertemporally) comparable information about private pension 
schemes show that the coverage of the second and third pillar in Germany is far higher than in 
Austria – with differences around 10 to 20 percent of coverage in the occupational and up to 10 
percent in the individual private pillar (OECD 2007: 78, OECD 2009: 141, OECD 2011: 173, OECD 
2012: 105, OECD 2013: 189). Due to the hybrid nature of the severance pay legislation in Austria, 
it is not considered as a second pillar pension in OECD publications. A comparison of those OECD 
publications is given in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1: Coverage of private pensions according to different OECD publications 
(as % of working age population) 
 
*taken as percentage of total population 
** taken as percentage of employees subject to social insurance contributions 
Note: Figure 1 compares data from different OECD publications; own depiction. Data is not intertemporally 
comparable nor does the year of the publication correspond to the year the data refers to. Source: OECD 
2007: 78; OECD 2009: 141; OECD 2011: 173; OECD 2012: 105; OECD 2013: 189; OECD 2015: 187. 
Furthermore, it is not easy to assess total coverage of private pensions and therefore the second 
and third pillar combined. Figure 2 shows such a comparison of second plus third pillar pensions 
between several OECD countries, including Austria. It is clearly visible that private pensions show 
a much higher coverage rate among the workforce in Germany than in Austria, which is consistent 
with the previously cited research.  
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Figure 2: Coverage of voluntary private pensions 
 
Note: Reproduced from Pensions at a Glance. Public Policies across OECD countries (p. 78) by the OECD, 
2004. Paris: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
As a cautionary remark, it has to be noted that in Germany, the second and the third pillar are not 
acting as a real substitute for the first pillar, even if their subsidization and coverage rate is much 
higher than in Austria. The short-run cutbacks in the public system were smaller than in Austria (cf. 
Busemeyer 2005), but in the long-run, the cutbacks in the German system are much more 
significant.  Additionally, the second and the third pillar cannot fully compensate the long-run 
cutbacks of the first pillar, which are projected to be substantial (cf. Meyer 2015: 192ff.). For 
example, it is often argued that the German reform will most likely to produce fundamental 
inequality and old age poverty among future recipients (Schmähl 2007; Bridgen/Meyer 2014, 
Meyer 2015: 189). This may be due to the risks of longer absence from the labour market, financial 
market crisis as well as due to the voluntary nature of the new schemes - especially persons with 
lower income are unlikely to make use of them, which leads to substantial coverage gaps 
(Schmähl 2007, Meyer 2015: 189). In this respect, Blank et al. even talk about a “model of 1 to 3 
pillars” (Blank et al. 2016a: 7). The financing mode of third pillar plans has also strong implications 
on future benefits, as an interruption of payments (for example due to unemployment or childcare) 
will directly affect benefits. Riester and Rürup plans are not indexed to inflation, and the indexation 
of occupational plans is usually lower than inflation (Wiß 2011: 196-200). However, according to 
Meyer (2015: 194), those failures of the reform are unlikely to result in a change in governmental 
policy back towards the traditional Bismarckian system due to the expected loss of reputation of 
political players, foreseeable resistance by employers as well as the comparatively rather low 
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political importance of the topic at recent elections. So as could be seen in this chapter, pension 
reform in Austria and Germany differed drastically. But how can we explain those differences in the 
reform of the German and Austrian pension systems? Maybe a look at the literature will provide 
some first hints 
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3.  Studying pension reform 
3.1.  Explaining early reforms before 2000: path dependency and policy 
feedback 
This chapter will now explore the academic literature regarding pension reform, lining out the 
research puzzle and significance of this research. In the literature regarding welfare state and 
social policy reform, one of the most important approaches in explaining pension reform is clearly 
centred on the argument of path dependency and policy feedbacks. One of the most popular 
studies explaining the different pension policy reform paths is “The Comparative Political Economy 
of Pension Reform” by Myles and Pierson (2001). They argue that the initial differences between 
Bismarckian and Beveridge-type pension systems have heavily influenced the following pension 
reforms, therefore constituting a case of path-dependency. In the 1980s, the first discussions about 
a “pension crisis” began to spread. Demographic change, increased budgetary constraints or slow 
economic growth were all seen as immediate threats to pension systems, and voices for a reform 
away from pay-as-you-go financing towards funded pension systems were increasingly prominent. 
While the threats towards pension systems were roughly similar in many countries, policy reactions 
differed drastically (Myles/Pierson 2001: 308). 
The authors explain the choice between a further reliance on a pay-as-you-go system versus the 
reform of the first pension pillar towards a new capital-funded pension system mainly as a result of 
policy feedback effects. They identify two distinct groups of countries with regard to their pension 
policy paths, namely “latecomers” (which are roughly the abovementioned Beveridge-type 
countries) and countries with mature pay-as-you-go systems (which can be Bismarckian countries 
as well as Beveridge-type countries which introduced their second tier pay-as-you-go system 
relatively early). The central factor influencing the different reform options between “latecomers” 
and countries with mature pay-as-you-go systems lies in the varying costs resulting from the so 
called “double-payment” problem, so the authors. This means that in countries with a “mature” pay-
as-you-go system, much more people have gained expensive pension rights which must be 
financed by the present working population. If such a mature country now decides to switch to a 
funded pension system, the present working population will have to finance both the current 
pensioners in the old pay-as-you-go system as well as save for their own retirement in the funded 
pension system, resulting in a dual burden.  In contrast, this barrier is lower in countries where pay-
as-you-go systems are relatively young (as fewer individuals have gained expensive pension 
rights) or did not even exist previously. Therefore, the reform options in countries with mature pay-
as-you-go systems are much more restrained, and it is highly unlikely that those countries will fully 
change to a funded pension system. The timing or sequencing of pension reforms (before or after 
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having a mature second-tier PAYG-scheme) is therefore highly relevant (Myles/Pierson 2001: 
313). 
In latecomer-countries, which mainly have Beveridge-style pension systems with a first tier flat-rate 
basic pensions without a (significant) pay-as-you-go, earnings related, second tier pension system, 
a construction of a funded scheme was “not only politically feasible but also the norm” 
(Myles/Pierson 2001: 315). Furthermore, according to Myles and Pierson, pension reform was 
mostly conducted with broad political consensus, as even labour parties favoured a funded system 
(often because of the underdeveloped or non-existent second tier). The authors argue that this 
change in the mode of financing went hand in hand with a change in responsibilities, as benefits 
depend on returns on investment. Now, financial markets or fund managers were to blame for 
pension cuts, rather than the government. Ultimately, the authors mention that only a minority of 
countries with a mature pay-as-you-go pension system have introduced funded modes of pension 
financing, and if, then only partially. Policy reforms were usually shaped by austerity. However, 
similar to latecomer countries, those reforms were often conducted via consensus and with the 
approval of the labour party. Myles and Pierson emphasize that broad consensus was necessary 
in order to be able to avoid blame for retrenchment, therefore, political “side payments” in form of 
new privileges for risk groups were popular. In both groups of countries, politics of blame 
avoidance dominated, which Pierson and Myles consider to be a major element of welfare state 
reform (ib.: 313-326). 
3.2.  The development of the private pensions: varieties of capitalism and 
the two worlds of pension reform 
Myles and Pierson’s theory explains fundamental reforms for Beveridge-type countries, while in 
Bismarckian style countries, reform options remain limited due to the respective policy path of 
those countries. However, those theories are mostly limited on the first, public pillar of pension 
provision and do not adequately explain the different extent in which private second and third 
pension pillars have emerged in countries with a Bismarckian tradition of pension provision.   
Consistent with the analysis by Myles and Pierson, Bonoli (2003) argues that due to the limited role 
of the state in Beveridge-type countries, multipillar pension system have started to emerge. As the 
state was only responsible for the basic needs, “this limited role […] has left ample room for the 
development of private and or occupational pensions” (Bonoli 2003: 401). In other words, a second 
and third pillar of pension provision, based on a funded mode of financing, was often integrated as 
a (quasi-)compulsory service into domestic pension systems. In contrast, in Bismarckian style 
countries, the state was crowding out private pension provision and therefore the development of 
private pension pillars – at least until recently (ibid.: 400f.). 
 24 
 
Bonoli (2003) lays a greater emphasis on the reforms of those Bismarckian style countries. In his 
study, he examines four countries with a strong social insurance tradition, namely France, 
Germany, Italy and Sweden, which have all experienced pension reforms in the 1990s. Public 
pension benefits have been reduced, and elements of multipillar pension systems, namely a 
funded second and third pillar, have slowly been introduced, supposedly compensating the 
reduced public pension benefits. While Bonoli acknowledges that those pension systems will 
remain dominated by the first pillar for a few years, he nonetheless states that those countries are 
becoming more similar to multipillar countries. He argues that while “the size of change in this 
direction is probably not so impressive, […] its political and potential long-term implications could 
be enormous” (ibid.: 412f.). The strategy of shifting responsibility from the state (and therefore 
public pay-as-you-go pensions) to the private sector and financial market performance resembles 
the strategy of blame avoidance in Pierson and Myles’ latecomer countries. Higher contributions to 
funded pension schemes are directly linked with higher future benefits, and lower benefits will be 
attributed to financial markets or fund management rather than government policy. However, he 
concludes that total convergence of Bismarckian and Beveridge countries is rather unlikely, due to 
the different policy responses towards changing and more flexible labour markets. Even in this 
small set of countries observed by Bonoli, not all Bismarckian-style countries seem to take that 
direction, as in France, funded pension systems remain unpopular (ibid.: 405-414). Ultimately, the 
divergence between recently reformed Bismarckian style pension systems can still not be 
adequately explained.  
Another theory trying to explain the different predominance of funded versus pay-as-you-go 
pension systems has been conducted by Jackson and Vitols (2001) with the Varieties of Capitalism 
approach. They argue that market economies, like the United States or United Kingdom, tend to 
rely heavily on externally managed pension funds, while the role of private pension funds in 
coordinated market economies, like the Scandinavian or continental European countries, remains 
relatively limited due to the predominance of generous public pensions. In coordinated market 
economies, the authors find occupational second pillar pension systems which rely predominantly 
on internally administered schemes, for example through book-reserves, as they historically 
emerged in order to create loyalty between the worker and his employer instead of his social class. 
Due to the internal book-reserve financing, firms would be able to use “interim cash as internal 
finance” (Jackson/Vitols 2001: 18) with additional tax privileges. Therefore, those schemes would 
supply long-term capital to firms and enable them provide secure employment opportunities 
corresponding to the concept of coordinated market economies. The authors put those countries in 
contrast to liberal market economies, external market-based pension funds are predominant, and 
self-investment of pension funds into their sponsoring companies is usually prohibited or capped. 
Maximizing returns on investment, they increase the size of the equity market as well as market 
volatility, creating short-term pressure onto firms to increase profits, therefore increasing radical 
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innovations but also employment insecurity, which are features of liberal market economies (ibid.: 
4-24.). Ultimately, this approach offers additional explanations for the development of multiple 
pension pillars, but it does not explain differences between the development of those pillars 
between relatively similar coordinated market economies like Austria and Germany. 
3.3.  New politics, policy preferences, veto players and hidden 
mechanisms of change 
Another aspect of the famous “new politics of the welfare state” literature connected to policy 
feedback and path dependency arguments explains opposition to pension reform from the 
viewpoint of the beneficiaries of those systems (Pierson 1994). As rational actors, beneficiaries 
accordingly oppose reform of pension systems if this means personal benefit cutbacks. However, 
not only direct beneficiaries may be part of such a tendency, as the same may also be true for 
persons who only indirectly benefit from such programs, for example bureaucrats. Another factor 
which reinforces these dynamics is the often assumed loss aversion of individuals (Pierson 1994: 
18). In other words, they are assumed to oppose benefit cuts more than promote possible 
equivalent gains (cf. Pierson 1994). This has several implications for pension systems and their 
reform.   
One popular prediction is that due to the ever rising cohort of beneficiaries of pension systems, 
pension reform will become increasingly unlikely as demographic change progresses. This would 
be consistent with the theories of Esping-Andersen, who argued that social policies could be frozen 
due to the preferences of the median voter (cf. Esping-Andersen 1999). Lynch and Myrskylä 
(2009) try to verify those theories by examining voter’s preferences for pension policies. However, 
they find no evidence for the policy-feedback hypothesis that beneficiaries of pension systems 
show policy preferences in favour of “defending” the status quo. The authors have tested this 
hypothesis not only regarding the level of pension benefits, but also the financing mechanism. 
Interestingly, also the latter preferences seem not to be influenced by the current level of pension 
income. Therefore, they suggest that “fluid, political factors rather than more permanent 
institutional ones may drive public opinion about particular reform options” (Lynch/Myrskylä 2009: 
1093). Another useful insight of this study is that other explanations like ideological factors and 
general welfare state attitudes seem to be highly connected to pension policy preferences (ibid.: 
170).  Policy preferences are not as simple as the “new politics” approach assumes. Therefore, a 
study of the role of ideology and ideas in general might prove to be especially fruitful. 
Policy preferences are also central in theories about “veto players” and “veto points”. Concerning 
veto points theory, Immergut (1990, 2007) argues that too much focus is laid on the strength and 
preferences of veto groups, i.e. special interest groups in a society, while the decision is actually 
dependent on the institutional characteristics of the different political systems, namely the 
 26 
 
existence of so-called “veto points”. As political decisions are made within executive, legislative, 
judicative and electoral arenas, the number and location of veto points as well as the preferences 
of the representatives within those veto points determines the political success of policy reform 
proposals. Examples for veto points are presidents, lower chambers, constitutional courts or 
referenda. (Immergut 1990: 391, 393, 398; Immergut 2007: 7) 
The veto player approach extends this framework. Tsebelis (1995) defines a veto player as “an 
individual or collective actor whose agreement is required for a policy decision” (Tsebelis 1995: 
293). There are several types of veto players. Tsebelis focuses on partisan veto players, which are 
the parties which constitute a coalition government, and institutional veto players, specified by the 
constitution. The former are informal veto players, as it may be possible for a political party to 
bypass its coalition partner, although it is most likely unfavourable. The latter are equivalent to 
Immergut’s veto points. Additionally, Tsebelis mentions that there may be several other types of 
veto players like central banks, corporatist institutions, courts or referenda. The major determinants 
of how veto players influence policy reform are constituted by 3 dimensions according to the 
author: the number of veto players, the difference of the political positions between different veto 
players, and the internal cohesion of each veto player. Ultimately, the theory predicts that the 
number and the internal cohesion of veto players have a negative effect on the likelihood of policy 
and therefore pension reform, while congruence between veto players has a positive effect 
(ibid.:293, 302-305, 313). 
The veto player and veto points approach has been extremely useful for explaining recent pension 
reforms, and several studies have made use of those frameworks. Busemeyer (2005) tackles the 
different outcomes of pension reform in Germany and Austria. He argues that due to the higher 
influence of informal veto players in the German political system, the government had to choose a 
strategy of low visibility policies concerning pension reform. Therefore, the German pension reform 
systematic change where significant cutbacks occurred only in the long-run. In contrast, due to the 
lower importance of veto players in Austria, the Austrian government would have been able to 
choose a much simpler method to reduce the costs of pension systems, namely a direct strategy of 
“pushing through” and short-run cutbacks, even in the face of political resistance from the 
opposition (Busemeyer 2005: 1f., 578). 
While Busemeyer’s argument sounds reasonable in the first place, it is implicitly based on a crucial 
assumption, namely that the only goal of pension reform in both countries was to reduce welfare 
state expenditures. However, there may have been other goals, namely reinforcing market 
mechanisms. This is especially likely if we look at the rhetoric of the Austrian centre-right 
government, which made individual freedom and a stronger market economy one of their central 
election issues (cf. Tálos/Obinger 2006: 26). However, why was the Austrian government not able 
to increase marketization of the pension system (and therefore the introduction of funded pension 
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schemes) as far as the German government? A possible answer comes from Wiß (2012), who 
argues that pension reforms are even possible in countries with a high number of veto players if 
they can be properly compensated for giving their agreement to policy reform – namely through so 
called “package solutions”, which grant them a strong future veto position within the administration 
of the newly reformed pension system (Wiß 2012: 468f.). Therefore, in the light of this theory, we 
could expect that the German government has been more successful in offering “compensation” to 
their respective veto players than in Austria. 
However, Busemeyer’s study not only incorporate elements of veto player and veto points theory, 
but also notes that “the existence of powerful veto player encourages the use of low visibility 
policies” (ibid.: 570). This strongly resembles recent studies which have shown that there are 
several ways through which policy makers can enact reforms against heavy resistance, mainly 
based on the works of Thelen (2003) and Hacker (2004). Thelen criticizes the path dependency 
and policy feedback theories as overly emphasizing “lock-in mechanisms” or “choice points”, 
therefore coming to “a rather deterministic view of institutional reproduction” (Thelen 2003: 212). 
She emphasizes that there are more “subtle” ways of institutional change, happening often 
creepingly over longer time periods, namely policy layering (Schickler 2001: 13) and policy 
conversion (ibid.: 212f.).  
Hacker (2004) incorporates those elements into a model of four modes of policy change with which 
welfare state retrenchment can be conducted. While he acknowledges that path dependency and 
policy feedback may be crucial for policy reform, he argues that such approaches are only able to 
focus on one single mode of institutional change, namely formal policy revision, which is possible 
in the presence of low policy feedback effects, or highly discretional modes of institutional 
governance and few veto players. However, there are other “hidden” mechanisms with which 
institutional change is possible and which are not based on legislative reform, namely policy drift, 
policy conversion and policy layering. Drift happens in the presence of societal change, slowly 
distorting the effect of policies while leaving policies themselves untouched. However, efforts from 
other parties to adapt those policies to new social circumstances have to be actively blocked. 
Policy conversion is possible through changing the institution’s purpose or goal internally within the 
institution, while leaving formal legislation untouched. Finally, through layering, new institutions are 
added on top, slowly undermining the old ones, without officially changing their legislation. Hacker 
argues that layering is especially often used in situations with high partisan power but high levels of 
policy feedback (which creates lock-in situations for some aspects of the institution) and a rather 
low leeway for inter-institutional agents like bureaucrats to implement legislation. (Hacker 2004: 
244-248) 
Not surprisingly, layering seems to be especially fitting for many pension reforms, especially recent 
reforms in Bismarckian countries which aimed to introduce multiple pension pillars. As Thelen 
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outlines, “even though conservative parties may be incapable of dismantling the old [public PAYG] 
system, in some cases they can effect changes in the overall trajectory of social security by 
actively promoting the development of privately funded [second and third pillar] pensions alongside 
the public system” (Thelen 2003: 226f.).  
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4.  Analysing ideas and discourse in pension reforms 
4.1.  The role of ideas in pension reform 
This chapter presents the theoretical foundations of this master thesis and how they are connected 
to the research puzzle lined out in chapter 3. Béland (2007) delivers a fresh approach to those 
“hidden” mechanisms of policy change mentioned at the end of chapter 3. He addresses the issue 
that while policy drift, conversion and layering can offer a plausible explanation for welfare state 
change and show the limits of path dependency theory, they nonetheless cannot explain the 
directions of those changes. Therefore, Béland proposes to lay greater emphasis on the role of 
ideas in explaining social policy change. Like Hacker (2004), Béland identifies several periods of 
policy conversion and policy layering in the development and reform of the US American social 
security system. The direction of those policy conversion and layering is, Béland argues, heavily 
influenced by ideational processes and therefore so-called policy paradigms (Béland 2007: 23, 24-
27). 
The concept of policy paradigms is based on Hall’s famous work on policy change, constituting one 
of the earlier works addressing the role of ideas (Hall 1993). Hall introduces a three-tier system of 
policy change. He defines first order policy change as mainly a change in the level or conditions of 
a certain policy, for example the level of unemployment benefits, or generally changes in the 
government budget. He explains such changes are mainly due to learning processes and the 
influence of experts - as a reaction to “past experience and new information” (ibid.: 278). Second 
order policy change occurs when policy instruments or “techniques” change. In social policy, one 
example would be a change from benefits in kind to monetary benefits. Like in the case of first 
order policy change, the process of social learning by experts is the main explanatory factor. 
Ultimately, Hall characterises third order change through a change in policy goals, or in their 
hierarchy, for example a shift from the goal of low unemployment to low inflation. This is 
accompanied by a shift of policy paradigms, which offer contrasting explanations and descriptions 
of certain problems and the ways in which they can be addressed. When a policy paradigm proves 
itself to be unsuited to address reality, the struggle between paradigms will be decided in the 
political or public arena (ibid.: 278f., 281, 283, 287). 
This explanation for paradigm change is consistent with the arguments of Jacobs (2009). Jacobs 
answers the question how ideas matter in welfare state policies with a theoretical framework 
through which ideas can explain policy preferences and the attention of political actors. He argues 
that ideas can act as a sort of filter for new information, especially if the political field of reform is 
shaped by causal and informational complexity. Building on social psychology, he introduces the 
concept of “mental models”. Mental models are a simplified framework for understanding 
descriptive as well as causal contents of a certain issue. One example could be the mental model 
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of pensions as insurance, highlighting the pension scheme’s balance of income against 
obligations. Ultimately, such mental models influence an actor’s preference in a way in which the 
models “guide[s] […] attention toward certain causal logics and pieces of information” (Jacobs 
2009: 253). In other words, ideas weight certain pieces of information heavily while discounting 
alternative information, therefore influencing the agent’s policy preferences. Political actors are 
subsequently subject to a confirmation bias, taking only information into account which confirms 
their conventional mental models. Only if outcomes incongruent with the mental models arise 
extensively and at multiple times, ideational change is possible, Jacobs argues. Ultimately, those 
mental models seem to be mostly similar to Hall’s definition of a policy paradigm (ibid.: 253f., 258f., 
260, 264). 
Béland (2007) now argues that in addition or also due to other factors like electoral competition 
and interest groups, such a change in policy paradigms can explain the direction of policy layering, 
drift and conversion. According to Béland, one example is the development of US social security. A 
paradigm change from a “conservative actuarial paradigm” to a new emphasis on the role of 
adequacy, redistribution and support for the “family unit” has led to the restructuring of the 
originally self-supporting social security system based on a trust fund into a “clear-cut concept of 
social insurance” with general revenue financing through policy conversion (Béland 2007:  24f.). 
Similarly, Béland argues, a paradigm change to the so called “financial paradigm”, which promotes 
liberal (libertarian) values of individualism, personal responsibility and economic stimulation 
through increased savings, will too have its effect on the pension system. It has justified the partial 
and indirect privatization of social security since the 1970 through the introduction of optional and 
privately funded retirement schemes and therefore policy layering. This ultimately means that the 
logic of the former pay-as-you-go system is increasingly questioned. Therefore, Béland comes to 
the conclusion that “layering is an instrument of conservative policy change that favours the 
promotion of specific policy ideas aimed at convincing citizens […] that it is in their interest to 
support Social Security privatization” (Béland 2007: 31).  Therefore, even politicians opposed to 
privatization are under stark pressure to somehow support such measures “considering the 
ideological weight of the financial paradigm” (ibid.: 29-32). 
Manow’s (1998) arguments about the development of the German pension system resemble those 
of Béland (2007). Similar to the work of Hall (1993) and his framework of first, second and third 
order policy change, the article by Manow (1998) shows that major changes in pension policy 
(which are third order policy changes) were not only the outcome of a simple government change, 
but were rather associated with the different concepts of society influencing how trust in pension 
systems was fostered in the political and public arena. Those different concepts of society are 
similar to Hall’s policy paradigms.  
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Ultimately, Manow (1998) is able to identify distinctive time periods. In those periods, different 
concepts of society were prevailing. Indirectly, he associates a change in political and public 
discourse during those time periods with reforms concerning the mode of financing pension 
systems, namely funded versus pay-as-you-go pension systems. He argues that different concepts 
of society have dominated the discourse since the beginning of the 20th century. Those concepts 
(or paradigms), which shaped pension policy from the Weimar republic up to the second half of the 
20th century, are the “individualist” perspective (a funded system) versus the “collective” 
perspective (a pay-as-you-go system). Up to the end of the second world war, a funded pension 
system was preferred. Even in the case of a collapse of the state, such a system should have 
ensured that the citizens could still get back their contributed money. Second, a pay-as-you-go 
system was associated as “living on the future generations expenses”, while saving for retirement, 
like in a funded system, was considered as the only respectable way of designing a pension 
system based on conservative ideology. Even after the collapse of the system due to hyperinflation 
and economic crisis following the First World War, discourse did not change, and trust was still laid 
in a funded pension system. A funded system was still regarded as the “only respectable financing 
method” (Manow 1998: 195-199). 
As the National Socialists came into power, this marked a shift towards the period called “national 
time” by Manow, lasting from 1935-1969. Discourse changed, as the state (or the Third Reich) was 
now considered to be eternal, and corresponding scientific concepts emerged not only in Germany, 
but also in Great Britain. One of the most important theories in this regard was the “Mackenroth-
Thesis”. It states that pensioners could only consume what workers produce, therefore, savings 
accumulated in a funded system were irrelevant – if fewer goods are produced, the lower supply 
would drive up prices and diminish the net-worth of the pension fund.  This marked a paradigm 
change, as the society was now identified collectively, and the state guaranteed stability. To rebuild 
Germany, redistributive conflicts were adjourned, and even redistribution from future towards 
present generations was seen as acceptable, as this could be compensated from wealth generated 
in the present. Manow connects this reference to Keynesian economic policies. Ultimately, 
discourse has changed again, as the oil crisis of the 1969s marked the end of the prevailing 
Keynesian paradigm. Suggestions towards a (independent) funded system have emerged again, 
and are still in talks. The battle between the “individualist” perspective (a funded system) versus 
the “collective” perspective (a pay-as-you-go system) has gained new relevance (ibid.: 199-207). 
Of course, the article by Manow was written in the 1990s, and misses recent reforms towards 
funded pension schemes in Germany. Furthermore, this study lacks a comprehensive theoretical 
framework in order to capture the effect of ideas on policy reform, mainly because the aim of his 
study is a different one. Nonetheless, it already indirectly points towards the importance of ideas 
and discourse. Not external shocks alone led to a change in the organization of the pension 
system, as can be seen in the time period after the First World War. Similar to Hall’s framework, 
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reform became only possible in combination with a change in policy paradigms and public 
discourse.  
4.2.  From theory… 
The goal of this master thesis however is to incorporate the possible influence of policy ideas and 
discourses (both in the sense of specific policies and as policy paradigms) in a theoretical 
framework in order to help to explain the different extent of reform towards funded pension 
systems in previously mature pay-as-you-go pension systems, namely Germany and Austria. How 
do policy ideas and discourses influence the (pension) policy to be implemented in very similar 
contexts like Austria and Germany? A useful starting point for examining the impact of policy ideas 
can be reached through building upon Kingdon’s (2001) “three stream” framework and its further 
development by Béland (2005). 
Kingdon identifies “streams” through which ideas shape policy outcomes: the problem stream, the 
policy stream and the political stream (Kingdon 2001: 16-20). All those three problem streams 
show mechanisms with which ideas can either favour or complicate the introduction of welfare 
state reforms, with the greatest policy changes resulting from a combination of all three streams. In 
the problem stream, relevant political issues are selected, in other words, the agenda is set. In the 
policy stream, a list of acceptable and prominent alternatives to tackle the identified problems is 
produced. Those alternatives are offered through policy experts, interest groups, or governmental 
agencies and are influenced by heterogeneous interests like business or think tanks (Béland 2005: 
6-9; Kingdon 2001: 16-20). They are usually based on specific policy paradigms, which are a 
“coherent set of assumptions about the function of economic, political and social institutions” 
(Béland 2005: 8,) standing in opposition to other policy paradigms, and also on a “dominant 
national ideology” (Kingdon 2001: 134). Kingdon describes this process similar to “biological 
natural selection” according to constraints like efficiency, feasibility or dominant values and ideals 
(Béland 2005: 6-9, Kingdon 2001: 16-20). Finally, the political stream captures the political capacity 
to implement a certain policy alternative in reaction to a problem. This depends on elections, 
campaigns by interest groups and public opinion. First, somebody has to promote the alternative, 
namely a “policy entrepreneur”. The concept of framing shows how actors are able to break the 
hegemonic discourse (Campbell 2002: 26ff.). Frames are a strategic combination of “certain ideas 
from amongst a range of options” (ib.: 429), also drawing from competing discourses, telling 
coherent “policy stories” (ib.: 430) and making a policy normatively and cognitively acceptable 
(Campbell 2002: 27). The policy entrepreneur uses so called “shared ideological repertoires” 
(which can be cultural concepts like solidarity) in order to “frame” public and political discourses 
about the problems until the proposed policy alternative is seen as an acceptable solution.  Béland 
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argues that framing is crucial in welfare state politics because it helps to moderate the public 
uproar about possibly painful reforms (Béland 2005 :10). 
According to Kingdon (2001), several actors can participate in the three streams. While there may 
be some groups who are most likely to participate in a specific stream (like academics or civil 
servants in the policy stream), there is generally no limitation to where they engage. Such 
participants may be politicians, civil servants, interest groups, academics, consultants, political 
parties, the media as well as public opinion and so on. Kingdon furthermore brings in the term 
“policy entrepreneur”. In general, everybody of the earlier mentioned actors can be a policy 
entrepreneur if he is “willing to invest […] resources in pushing […] proposals […], coupling 
solutions to problems and […] coupling both problems and solutions to politics” (Kingdon 2001: 20) 
because of an expected future return. However, this does not mean that policy entrepreneurs act 
only because of (monetary) self-interest, as this “future return” may also be of ideological nature. 
Therefore, policy entrepreneurs are the key actors responsible for policy change (Kingdon 2001: 
20, 122f.). 
Béland offers no detailed explanation of the process of how various actors are able to frame 
discourse, while Kingdon solely focuses on the US American political system without explicitly 
studying discourse. This is where Schmidt’s so called “discursive institutionalism” has provided a 
ground-breaking framework for analysing the role of ideas and discourse in policy reform. As 
defined by Schmidt, policy discourses are the 
sum of policy and political actors’ accounts of a policy programmes purpose, objectives, 
and ideals which serve as a guide to action by defining the concepts and norms to be 
applied, identifying the problems to be solved, explaining the methods to be followed, 
developing the policy instruments to be used, […] framing the national policy discussion. 
(Schmidt 2002: 214) 
Schmidt’s focus on discourse reflects that she is not only interested in the content of ideas, which 
are policies as well as “organized principles and causal beliefs” like argued by Béland, but also on 
the “interactive process by which ideas are conveyed” (Schmidt 2008: 305f.). Ultimately, discourse 
constitutes the missing link between ideas and policy change, capturing the process of “how ideas 
go from thought to word to deed”, or in other words, how ideas result in policies and how they 
influence and are influenced by certain actors (Schmidt 2008: 309). In other words, discourse 
captures the ways in which policy actors try to argue in favour of their policy ideas and therefore 
their understandings of social policy reform. Furthermore, this also means that we have to 
analytically separate policy discourse to some extent from its underlying values, beliefs and ideas 
in order to highlight the ability of using discourse in order to change those very same things (cf. 
Schmidt 2002a: 216). Discourses are therefore influenced by ideas, which can take the form of 
specific policies, policy paradigms or their underpinning “deeper” worldviews, as well as influence 
them (Schmidt 2008: 306).  
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 Concerning the influence of discourse on policy change, Brettschneider even argues that policy 
entrepreneurs (like defined by Kingdon) always have to be “discursive entrepreneurs" too 
(Brettschneider 2009: 190). Schmidt is more reserved, arguing that discourse can be a cause of 
policy change under certain assumptions, namely if it not only reflects interests, institutional paths 
and cultural norms, but rather serves to “reconceptualise interests, […] chart new institutional paths 
[…] and reframe cultural norms” (Schmidt 2002a: 212). This reflects the understanding of 
institutions within discursive institutionalism. Institutions are regarded as both the context as well 
as the result of actions, rejecting too strict arguments of path dependency, rational choice or 
cultural norms (Schmidt 2008: 314). Schmidt argues that agents are able to speak and act outside 
and even against their institutions even when they are inside them, enabling institutional change 
through discourse (“breaking the hegemonic discourse”) (ib.: 314ff.). This is why Schmidt argues 
that discursive institutionalism “puts agency back in institutionalism” (ib.: 316). 
Schmidt distinguishes between several dimensions of discourse. First, discourse can be either 
cognitive or normative (representing “what you say”). Cognitive discourse contains causal 
arguments in order to justify policies programs, therefore for example referring to concepts like 
technical feasibility or efficiency (Schmidt 2008: 306f.). It highlights that the promoted policy is the 
best way to reach a certain goal. However, it does not necessarily offer “facts” or the “truth”, but 
rather tries to convince that the promoted policies are necessary (Schmidt 2005: 7). In contrast, 
normative discourse assesses policies according to certain sets of norms and values, judging if the 
policy is “the right thing to do” (Schmidt 2008: 306f.). Brettschneider argues that policy 
entrepreneurs use discursive strategies (cognitive and normative ones, which are techniques of 
persuading public opinion), in order to change prevailing societal values, ideals and preferences 
(Brettschneider 2009: 191).  
Brettschneider (2009) offers several types of cognitive as wells as normative strategies for framing 
discourse with reference to discourse about the German Pension system. Cognitive strategies 
would be for example strategies of problem construction and knowledge market closure. 
Dramatization is one such strategy, which includes efforts to produce a permanent atmosphere of 
crisis and “staying on message”. Other strategies are selective communication or deliberate de-
thematization. Brettschneider also mentions paradigm destruction, which attacks the fundamentals 
of the pension system through referring to exogenous change or alleged design flaws and vicious 
cycles. Concerning normative strategies, the author presents strategies of re-interpreting existing 
as well as the introduction of new shared ideological repertoires (or adopting old one’s present in 
discourse in other policy fields) (cf. Béland 2005: 10). Those can be popular concepts like 
solidarity, justice or equality. Many of Brettschneider’s strategies are used in the empirical chapter 
5, supplemented by some strategies inductively discovered.   
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Second, coming back to Schmidt’s dimension of discourse, it also matters how you say something, 
as this drastically influences the political success of a certain policy with respect to criteria like 
adequacy, appropriateness or relevancy but especially consistency and coherence. Therefore, 
discourse at the same time promotes but also constrains policy reform with regard to past and 
present discourses. Arguments should nonetheless not be overvalued, as bargaining is also most 
likely another important way to gain support for a policy (Schmidt 2008: 312). 
Third, discourse can happen in 2 different spheres, the policy sphere or the political sphere, and 
therefore addresses different recipients (“to whom you say something”). Those two spheres are 
roughly equivalent to the concepts of the policy stream and the political stream as used by John 
Kingdon or Daniel Béland. However, in contrast to Béland, who locates discourse and the 
necessity to frame discourse mainly in the political stream, Schmidt distinguishes between two 
types of discourse according to the stream (or sphere) where they take place. Coordinative 
discourse, as it takes place in the policy stream, concerns policy construction. Actors in the policy 
stream promote policy alternatives compatible with their cognitive and normative ideas until “key 
policy groups” reach an agreement – which somehow resembles the “natural selection” process 
within the policy stream as described by Kingdon. Schmidt assumes that cognitive ideas are 
prevalent in the policy stream and therefore in coordinative discourse. Communicative discourse is 
situated in the political sphere, speaking to the public and trying to convince them that the policies 
and agreements reached through coordinative discourse in the policy sphere are necessary and 
normatively acceptable (Schmidt 2002b: 171f.) – what Béland defines as framing public discourse. 
As a reaction, the public can assert pressure through protest and periodic elections. However, as 
assumed by Kingdon, we can expect politicians often not to “squander their energy and capital on 
a losing cause” as the “costs of resources and reputation would be too great” in order to overcome 
a possible well-organized opposition (Kingdon 2001: 151ff.).   
Ultimately, Schmidt connects the importance of either coordinative versus communicative 
discourse to the institutional environment and the design of polities (“where you say something”). 
She argues that in political systems with a single authority (shaped by majoritarian representative 
institutions like Great Britain or France), communicative discourse is more important, while in 
countries where government activity is split between multiple actors (shaped by the importance of 
coalition governments as well as corporatist policy making), coordinative discourse would be 
predominant. This predominance of coordinative discourse in corporatist states stems from the 
assumption that a detailed communicative discourse with the public about reform agreements 
could contradict the compromises reached in the coordinative discourse by violating cognitive and 
normative criteria of reform partners as well as reveal the incoherence and inconsistency of those 
programs with respect to a certain discourse and its arguments. Therefore, communicative 
discourse will be vaguer, while in coordinative discourse, key policy groups also try to legitimize 
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“agreements through sub-discourses to their constituencies in terms of their own particular 
cognitive and normative criteria” (Schmidt 2005: 15). (Schmidt 2008: 313; Schmidt 2005: 15) 
4.3.  … to practice 
In this master thesis, the research puzzle shall be addressed that why very similar countries such 
as Austria and Germany differ significantly with respect to the extent in which they introduced 
elements of funded or private pension pillars, and therefore, initiated a structural change in their 
national pension system. More specifically, the main research question of this master thesis 
addresses the role of ideas and discourse in explaining such policy changes: How do policy ideas 
and discourses influence the (pension) policy to be implemented in very similar contexts like 
Austria and Germany? Therefore, the main hypothesis of this research is that the different extent of 
reform (incorporating new elements of private or funded pension systems via a process of layering 
a second and third pension pillar onto the old, public pay-as-you-go pension pillar) in Germany and 
Austria is (at least partly) a result of varying policy ideas and discourses (both in the sense of 
specific policies and as policy paradigms) in the respective domestic political as well as public 
arenas.  
In other words, it will be argued that Germany and Austria differ in how political actors, and 
therefore especially policy entrepreneurs, framed discourse while being relatively similar in other 
accounts. Through comparison of two very similar cases, namely Austria and Germany, alternative 
explanations are controlled for, therefore helping to highlight causal influence. Both countries are 
considered as conservative welfare states (cf. Esping-Andersen 1990) and are therefore similar 
considering their institutional characteristics. Both countries organized their pension system 
through a social insurance principle (Bismarckian pension systems), and both countries show a 
quite similar economic performance, have open economies and are part of the European 
Economic Area. In both countries, pension reform was seen as inevitable with respect to 
demographic and budgetary pressure, therefore, the countries problem streams were quite 
similar8. Taking into account all those possible alternative explanations, the effect discourse on 
pension reform is highlighted, providing for comparative evidence.  
However, the aim of this master thesis is not to assess those reforms implemented according to 
their necessity, adequacy, financial stability or effects on social inequality. The main hypothesis is 
that policy actors and entrepreneurs in Germany were able to implement wide ranging reforms 
because they successfully handled the policy and political stream, framing communicative 
discourse until privatized, funded pension policies were seen as “a normatively acceptable 
                                               
8 However, it has to be noted that already in the 1990s, OECD demographic projections for Germany hinted towards a 
more pessimistic scenario than in Austria (cf. Leibfritz 1995), and the costs of the German reunification reinforced the 
pressure lying on the German pension system (Meinhardt/Zwiener 2005).  
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solution”, while their Austrian counterparts failed to do so. This hypothesis shall be examined by a 
discourse analysis of Austrian and German communicative discourse captured through newspaper 
articles. In case that this hypothesis proves right, communicative discourse in Austria would be 
unfavourable towards privatization and structural change, while in Germany, the opposite picture 
should arise. If communicative discourse contrary to this hypothesis indeed does not influence the 
implementation of a reform, significant traces of deliberate framing in the communicative discourse 
would be unlikely.  
This research deliberately neglects the presumed importance of coordinative discourse, which 
remains unobserved as it (per definition) happens behind closed doors. According to Schmidt, we 
would expect coordinative discourse to be most important, as it has the most influence in 
corporatist countries like Austria and Germany. However, several arguments raise doubt on this 
assumption. First, Schmidt mentions that if coordinative discourse “breaks down”, communicative 
discourse can “reframe” coordinative discourse in order to bring all parties back to the negotiating 
table (Schmidt 2002b: 172f.). In such situations, communicative discourse can also legitimate 
reform without the agreement of key policy groups like corporatist institutions (ib.: 172f.). Such 
situations were visible during the pension reform process in both Germany and Austria, where 
coordinative discourse between the government and corporatist institutions broke down several 
times, necessitating commitment to a stronger communicative discourse (cf. Tálos/Obinger 2006: 
100; Anderson/Meyer 2003: 39). Second, pension reform in both countries was conducted by a 
newly elected government coalition. As Schmidt outlines, communicative discourse is especially 
important in times of elections (Schmidt 2002b: 172f.). Therefore, we could expect communicative 
discourse during the election campaigns to have a fundamental impact for the subsequent reforms. 
And finally, communicative discourse may also be important due to the design of the pension 
reforms. Pension reform was conducted through layering a private second and third pillar on top of 
the first public pension pillar, and participating in an additional pillar can be voluntary. Therefore, 
the public has to be convinced in order to make use of those newly available forms of old age 
provision, which again highlights the importance of communicative discourse.  
4.4.  Methodology and data 
First, an important aspect of this master thesis was to assess the extent of pension reform towards 
private and funded pension schemes and therefore structural change. This is necessarily captured 
in two dimensions. First, it was necessary to assess the extent of reform towards private and 
funded pension schemes through the actual design of the policy. For example: Are the newly 
introduced ways of pension provision voluntary or mandatory? What is the extent of subsidies? 
However, since parts of the pension system may be voluntary due to the reform, it was also 
necessary to take the take-up rate of the newly introduced pension pillars into account. For 
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example: How many people are using the third pension pillar? What is the coverage rate of those 
private pension funds? This variation was assessed through relying on secondary literature and is 
described in chapter 2.   
However, the main part of the thesis is the discussion of the variation in discourses. 
Methodologically, I incorporate some of the “methods for discourse- and dispositive analysis” 
(Jäger 2001: 96; translation: D.U.) outlined by Sigfried Jäger. Jäger is an advocate of critical 
discourse analysis (CDA). This theoretical tradition states that discourses are institutionally 
established manners of speaking, therefore expressing power relations, determined by as well as 
determining actions and shaping agency (Wodak/Busch 2004: 111). Therefore, knowledge can 
also be produced by discourses, and reality can be constituted through the repetition of discursive 
practices. A consequence of this logic are so called discursive struggles, which are a form of power 
struggles trying to define or redefine a standard (and the deviation from it), for example moral 
standards (Keller a.o. 2001: 12). This is what makes Jäger’s methods fitting for this thesis, as this 
conception of discourse is close to Schmidt’s discoursive institutionalism, where she states that 
discourse reflects interests, institutional paths and cultural norms, but vice versa can also 
“reconceptualise interests, […] chart new institutional paths […] and reframe cultural norms” 
(Schmidt 2002a: 212).  
One of the most important terms within the Jägers’ (2001) CDA methods are so called discourse 
fragments. Basically, those fragments are parts of texts, however, one text can consist of many 
discourse fragments of different topics. Therefore, if a text only approaches one topic, then the 
whole text is a single discourse fragment of this topic. In Jäger’s terminology, all discourse 
fragments of one topic combined are a discourse strand. Therefore, the relevant discourse strand 
for this research project is the discourse strand about pension reform in the respective countries. 
Additionally, Jäger introduces discourse levels, which he describes as social locations. Discourses 
operate on many different levels, for example politics, media, education, and those levels can be 
interlinked. Transferring this terminology to Schmidt’s discursive institutionalism, the political 
discourse level is consistent with coordinative while the media discourse level is consistent with 
communicative discourse (cf. Jäger 2001: 96ff., 102f.).  
Insights by Schmidt and Brettschneider which were already offered in the previous section should 
furthermore give a first impression of how discourse varies and functions. Generally, what is said is 
the main category analysed in this research project, which is equivalent with cognitive and 
normative discursive strategies. Discoursive strategies are taken from Brettschneider (2009) and 
therefore deductive, but additional discoursive strategies were discovered inductively. Through 
discourse analysis in chapter 5, such discoursive strategies will be identified and discussed. 
Discoursive strategies taken from Brettschneider (2009) as well as new inductively discovered 
strategies are listed in Table 2.  
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Table 2: Deductive and inductive (*) discoursive strategies analysed 
 
Note: Inductively discovered strategies are marked with *. Other strategies are taken from Brettschneider 
(2009).  
Analysis will also incorporate how those things are said, focusing mainly on coherence and 
consistency. However, in addition to already existing theoretical contributions from Schmidt and 
Brettschneider, it will be argued that when something is said also matters, bringing time into the 
analysis. And finally, it matters if strong opposing discoursive actors are present which may be able 
to defend their policy ideas. Those issues (how, when, opposing discoursive actors) are partly 
already mentioned during the specific empirical country chapters 5.1 and 5.2 but are more explicitly 
tackled in chapter 5.3.   
Communicative discourse is empirically captured by analysing media coverage about pension 
reform in Austria and Germany. Media articles are provided via the “APA Online Manager Library” 
database as well Axel Springer SE’s “DIGAS” online archive. The APA database provides access 
Strategies 
favoring pension 
privatization and 
capital-funding
Cognitive strategies Dramatization
De-Thematization
Scientific Objectification International comparison
Experts talk*
Paradigm Destruction Vicious Cycle
Exogeneous Change
Selective Communication
Win-Win Situation*
Common Knowledge*
Normative strategies 
(ideological repertoires)
Saving the welfare state*
Fairness and Justice Christian values* (thrift, neighourly love)
Equality*
Generational justice
Self-responsibility
Strategies 
opposing 
pension 
privatization and 
capital-funding
Cognitive Strategies Diversion through acceptance*
De-thematization
Paradigm defence*
Dramatization
Normative strategies 
(ideological repertoires)
Expansion talk*
Solidarity and Justice
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to all Austrian newspapers as well as a broad selection of foreign (and therefore also German) 
newspapers. The mostly read quality daily newspaper in Austria, namely Der Standard (leftwing-
liberal), would in general be available there. The German mostly-read counterpart to Der Standard 
would be the Süddeutsche Zeitung (leftwing-liberal), followed by the Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung (conservative). However, only the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung is available freely in the 
APA Online Manager Library, while the archive of the Süddeutsche Zeitung is restricted by a 
paywall. Therefore, the Frankfurter Allgemeine was chosen for this analysis. Due to their different 
political agenda, analysing Der Standard and Frankfurter Allgemeine would impose problems to 
the comparability of the data. Consequently, it was chosen to analyse the two quality newspapers 
with the respective second-best media penetration, Die Presse and the already mentioned 
Frankfurter Allgemeine, as both of them show a conservative agenda (cf. Bundeszentrale für 
politische Bildung).  
The above listed newspapers are quality newspapers which most likely do not reach a majority of 
the population. Therefore, we cannot necessarily expect those newspapers to reflect 
communicative discourse unbiased, as public discourse and public opinion will most likely be 
framed through TV and boulevard media to a certain extent. However, an analysis of TV shows 
may be too time consuming for this master thesis, therefore, a pragmatic approach with newspaper 
articles was chosen. While the mostly read boulevard newspaper Die Krone is available via the 
APA Online Manager Library, this does not hold for the German boulevard counterpart Bild, which 
only offers a very expensive archive service (DIGAS). However, funding was granted for this 
research project by the Austrian Chamber of Labour in Vienna, which makes it possible to access 
the archive of the Bild. Therefore, the APA Online Manager Library was used for gathering 
Frankfurter Allgemeine, Die Presse and Krone articles, while DIGAS was used for gathering Bild 
articles. 
For analysis and data collection of media articles, the extent of the discourse strand analysed has 
to be additionally limited. Jäger mentions the possibility to limit discourse strands according to 
discursive events, which influence future discourse dramatically (Jäger 2001: 96ff.). Those events 
must have been emphasized in the political or public sphere. With regard to this research project, 
important discursive events are the elections (and therefore also the election campaigns) of the 
respective governments which introduced reform as well as the introduction of the pension reform 
itself. Therefore, discourse analysis will focus around such discursive events. For the case of 
Austria, such events were the election in 1999 and mainly the reform of the severance pay 
legislation as well as the introduction of the subsidized private pensions in 2002 (Schulze/Schludi 
2007: 572f., 587, 590). For Germany, the election of 1998 as well as the pension reforms of 2001 
will be analysed (Schulze/Jochem 2007; 677f., 686, 693).  
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The articles were gathered via a keyword search as the topical marker search proved to be rather 
incomprehensive. Additionally, selection according to headings was also not suitable as many 
relevant articles would have been skipped. Therefore, the articles which have shown up in the 
keyword search have been sorted out again manually. This means that only articles which have 
either an own paragraph about pension reform or pension systems in general as well as articles 
whose topic is pension reform or pension systems are considered as “relevant articles” from here 
on (which practically means for most of the cases that at least 2 of the keywords are present in 
every relevant article). This second selection process reduces the overall number of articles 
substantially. Overall, 357 articles were considered as relevant and analysed within the scope of 
this master thesis. Articles were then imported into the qualitative data analysis package Dedoose, 
read and subsequently coded according to deductive discoursive strategies as provided by 
Brettschneider (2009) and Schmidt (2002) as well as discoursive strategies discovered inductively. 
Those strategies were identified through searching for justifications of policy alternatives proposed 
by the author directly as well as rather indirectly. For example: What is the main argument through 
which a certain policy is presented as favourable by a policy entrepreneur? Which kind of 
arguments does the policy entrepreneur actually introduce? Do they address cognitive or 
normative concerns? Then, the structure, functioning and logic of those justifications were 
compared to the discoursive strategies presented by Brettschneider (2009). If no existing strategy 
matched the justification provided by the author of the respective article, a new (inductive) strategy 
was constructed.  
All quotations of newspaper articles in this paper are translated by the author of this thesis.  
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5.  Communicative discourse on pension reform from an empirical 
perspective 
5.1.  Germany 
5.1.1.  The 1998 elections 
For the elections of the 27.9.1998, 3 months before the elections (and 1 day after) were analysed. 
The selection process for relevant articles reduces the overall number of articles gathered to 69 
and constitutes the data to be analysed for this period9. Pension reform was a major part of the 
discussion in the months before the elections of 1998 in Germany and relevant articles are 
distributed more equally over the observed period than in Austria, where most articles where 
posted in one single week. An interesting aspect regarding the actors of the German discourse is 
that the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) published a quite high share of commentaries 
regarding pension reform (in comparison to Die Presse in Austria), from guest writers as well as 
their own journalists. Because such personal opinions of journalists are often also transferred 
indirectly in other articles of the newspaper and may therefore be present in de facto every article 
gathered, it was decided to not create an own actor group of journalists. However, guest writers 
are identified as “experts” if they are presented as such10. These criteria will be applied throughout 
this paper and holds for all newspapers. Regarding these criteria for the identification of discursive 
entrepreneurs, the biggest actor group emerging are politicians of the Christian-democratic 
CDU/CSU with 22 mentions. The second group following are experts with 14 mentions, which also 
includes many representatives of banks if they were presented experts in the newspapers. Other 
important groups are the social-democrats with 12, the liberals with 11 mentions and the greens 
with 6 mentions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
9 It was searched for articles containing one of the following keywords: Pensionssystem, Rentenreform, 
Rentenversicherung, Altersversorgung, Altersvorsorge, Alterssicherung, Rentenniveau, Betriebsrente. Adding additional 
search instruments for filtering articles with at least two occurrences of the word “Rente“ increase the number of articles 
in the keyword search but only marginally increase the number of relevant articles. 
10 For example through descriptions as “professor for economics“, “head of the institute”, and so on. 
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Figure 3: Number of relevant articles according to calendar weeks before the election in Germany  
 
Note: Search conducted in APA online manager library in the FAZ and in the DIGAS online archive in the 
Bild.  
5.1.1.1.  Pro-Structural change: Hegemonic discourse in Germany 
Discourse about pension reform in Germany before the elections of 1998 is an ideal-typical 
example of a constant atmosphere of crisis. What is stunning in this regard is that there was 
already more or less a cross-party consensus about the existence of this crisis, only the proposed 
answerers to this crisis differed. However, also the nature of this crisis was subject to a relative 
consensus, and all parties to a certain extent criticized at least one aspect of the German pension 
system: its financing mechanism through pay-as-you-go or the low importance of private pension 
provision.  
The most important discursive strategies which stabilized the hegemonic discourse in Germany 
were of cognitive nature (with overall 92 occurrences in the data). Problem construction and 
knowledge market closure (cf. Brettschneider 2009) are dominating, with dramatization being the 
mostly used strategy, identified 32 times in the data.  
The public system has no future. The pay-as-you-go model for old-age does not pay off any 
more – at least not without steadily increasing federal subsidies and according to a fair 
treatment of acquired pension rights. This conclusion is accentuated in periods of economic 
downturns and through the burden of high unemployment. But the relevant reasons lie 
deeper, and they are of a constant nature: a reduction of working-time, increase of life 
expectancy and long-term demographic change are the real reasons for the overextension 
of public pension provision. A thorough reform towards capital-funded and profitable 
savings for old-age is necessary. (FAZ, 21.8.1998) 
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Above we can see an ideal-typical example of dramatization. Besides from especially lurid 
wording, like declaring that the pension system has “no future” 11, such dramatization efforts often 
involve “staying on message” (cf. Brettschneider 2009), which refers to emphasizing a statement 
through constant repetition. Like in most articles, the increasing federal subsidy (Bundeszuschuss) 
is depicted as a problem and as a symptom of the dysfunctionality of the pension system. The 
underlying assumption of this critique is the conception of the pension system according to the 
insurance principle. This is consistent with Jacobs’ (2009) analysis of German pension politics 
before the second world-war. He argues that policy makers predominantly chose their policy 
preferences according to information which confirmed their conventional mental model of a 
pension system, namely a pension system as an insurance. As this mental model depicts “a 
pension program as a closed self-supporting arrangement, much like a private insurance firm” 
(Jacobs 2009: 264), actuarial balances and an alleged risk of insolvency are overemphasized. 
Other alternative information not conforming this mental model is discounted and remains 
unmentioned, for example the dangers of capital funding as an alternative to pay-as-you-go 
systems and macroeconomic consequences to prices and currency values (Jacobs 2009: 264). 
The post-war mental model of pension systems as a redistributive model (cf. Jacobs 2009) seems 
to lose its relevance in the German pension politics of the 90s.  
Another aspect of dramatization can be seen in the following excerpt from an FAZ article, under 
the title “into pension nirvana”: 
Broken trust in the public pension system cannot be rebuild through promising additional 
benefits, in situations where already the existing level can hardly be financed. The labour 
unions do not leave any space for building up a second (occupational) or even third 
(private) pillar of pension provision in their pension model, despite paying lip service 
towards a multipillar model. Giving such ideas the attribute “reasonable” is reckless. (FAZ, 
17.8.1998)  
Not only is a constant atmosphere of crisis produced here, not least through especially lurid 
wording like before, delegitimizing any policy alternatives beside privatization. Many of such 
phrases may also act as self-fulfilling prophecies: if everybody talks about the “broken trust in the 
public pension system”, it is likely that people will indeed lose trust. Another form of problem 
construction outside of dramatization is so-called selective communication, which happened mainly 
through referring to the allegedly “low yields on contributions” in the public pension scheme, over 
13 times in the data.  
An alternative to the public pay-as-you-go pension system (where contributions are not 
saved, but instantly used for financing the current generation of pensioners) would be a 
capital-funded form of pension provision. Already since decades, such capital investments 
would yield higher rates of return than the public system for everyone born after 1930. 
                                               
11 Other examples for such lurid wording would be stating that “contributions [are] melting away” (FAZ, 6.7.1998), 
declaring a crisis “even in the most optimistic scenarios” (FAZ, 6.7.1998), adjuring “radical steps” (FAZ, 29.7.1998) or 
privatization as an “necessary supplement” (Bild, 6.7.1998). 
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Considering realistic assumptions, the birth cohort of 1980 could build up wealth equivalent 
to 3 times as high as in the public system with the same expenses. (FAZ, 6.7.1998) 
This can also be seen in the earlier quoted excerpt from the 22nd of August 1998. Only in a capital 
funded scheme, so the argumentation, would an adequate rate of return be possible, while the 
public pension scheme would be responsible for a “real loss of wealth”, as argued earlier in the 
abovementioned article. In contrast, drastically higher rates of return are promised by “experts” in a 
capital-funded scheme. Another even more radical example of such a line of argumentation depicts 
the public pension scheme as the original problem, not only its financing mechanism.  
The people have to save more, or they must work longer, or you would have to allow them 
to make a rate of return, like offered by the capital market for those who do not have the 
misfortune of being under the states tump. But politicians do not want to make those simple 
causalities transparent. Instead, they use trickery, close to cheating, sometimes ending in a 
breach of trust. (FAZ, 20.7.1998) 
Financial markets and capital funding are displayed as some kind of utopia, which is kept away for 
people “who have the misfortune of being under the state’s thumb”.  After times of the global 
financial crisis in the beginnings of the 2000s, such statements appear unintentionally hilarious. 
The low rate of return in the public system is constituted as a problem via a comparison with a 
capital funded scheme, which is displayed as being far superior. Not only are the risks of capital-
funded schemes (financial market risks, vulnerability to inflation) totally omitted in those 
representations, but the advantages also highly exaggerated through unrealistic but unmentioned 
assumptions about future interest rates and administrative fees (black boxing). For example, in 
2016, the nominal rate of return on all contributions of Riester-contracts introduced in 2001 was 
only marginally higher than 0 percent – in contrast to the promised 4 percent (Blank et al. 2016a: 
5f.). 
“Knowledge market closure” as defined by Brettschneider (2009) is also visible through deliberate 
de-thematization (7 occurrences), as can be seen in the already quoted statement of 20th of July 
1998. Statements which do not comply with the hegemonic discourse are quickly disqualified as 
“trickery, close to cheating”, or untrue (and also “bogus” (FAZ, 20.7.1998), often without further 
elaboration on the specific reasons for arriving at such a conclusion. Politicians are here usually 
not depicted as only incompetent, but also as deliberately telling the untruth, therefore reinforcing 
the picture of a “lying politician”. Such a strategy quickly delegitimizes opposing discoursive 
entrepreneurs but more importantly also their proposals of change within the current system (in 
contrast to structural change). Ultimately, those actors cannot easily respond to such an 
accusation when done by newspaper commentators, and simple rectifications in later issues 
(which did not happen) seldom reverse the already done damage to the credibility of the actors’ 
arguments. Other forms of problem construction and knowledge market closure like scientific 
objectification (for example through comparison) were far less important in Germany than in 
Austria, with only 5 reported cases. 
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Figure 4: Mostly used discoursive strategies in favour of privatization and capital-funding in 
Germany in the election period of 1998 (3 months) 
 
However, outside of problem construction and knowledge market closure, so-called paradigm 
destruction with 35 occurrences in the data is one of the main elements of Germany’s hegemonic 
discourse in the forefront of the elections. One way to conduct “paradigm destruction” is through 
referring to a change of exogenous conditions, which allegedly leads to a failure of the current 
pension system and would therefore necessitate systematic change. Of course, demographic 
change is the number one exogenous factor used for this strategic paradigm destruction, as can be 
seen in the already quoted statement of the 22nd of August 1998. Even generally pro-welfare 
parties like the Greens made similar statements: 
The Greens do not want to take back the pension reform [of the previous government] if 
they win the elections on the 27th September. The pension plans of the SPD would be 
“absolutely irresponsible”, so a strategy paper of Green’s budgetary speaker in the 
parliament, Oswald Metzger, says. “A complete abolishment of the pension reform is the 
opposite of what is necessary. A demographic component is indispensable”. (Bild, 
7.9.1998) 
Cutbacks in the public system, and consequently an expansion of private ways of pension 
provision and capital-funding (also in the public pillar) is promoted as the ideal solution. The 
question why a partly private system may be more successful to cope with such exogenous 
challenges or why it should be overall less expensive always remains unanswered – let alone the 
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presentation of empirical evidence. And the double payment problem (cf. Myles/Pierson 2001, or 
chapter 3.1 in this thesis) seems to be completely unknown to those who favour a complete 
restructuring of the public pillar towards capital-funding (for example in FAZ, 21.8.1998).  
Far more fundamental is the discussion about a demographic vicious cycle produced by public 
pension systems, which dominates half of the discussion about vicious cycles in the pension 
system. This is a type of paradigm destruction where problems of the pension system are said to 
exist endogenously due to its design (and not only due to exogenous change; cf. Brettschneider 
2009).  
There are only two ways to invest in the future: have children or create savings. Adenauer 
had the opinion that those investments would not need to be facilitated by the pension 
system, as people would have children anyway. He could not have imagined that […] social 
norms and life experience, being responsible for the behaviour of humankind and the 
pyramid form of the population structure for over centuries, would be abolished within a 
short period of time. However, this indeed happened, and it shows that disconnecting the 
costs of children from their benefits for their parents leads to a fundamental change in the 
behaviour of humans, in contrast to a normal family with children. (FAZ, 31.8.1998) 
According to this line of argumentation, public pension systems would create a free-rider problem. 
As everybody is covered by a public pension, the economic incentives to have children as a mean 
of old-age provision becomes irrelevant. However, as the pensions in a pay-as-you-go system are 
financed by the younger generations and are therefore dependent on the fertility rate, this would 
necessarily initiate a vicious cycle, ultimately leading to the systems break-down due to low fertility. 
So the public pension system is not only said to be subject to severe pressure by demographic 
change, but is also said to be the root of this demographic change, which again emphasizes the 
need for structural change in contrast to a simple change within the system. Of course, the 
implications of such a statement are twofold: on the one hand, it proposes to cut-back public 
pensions and increase forms of private provision but on the other hand it also favours the return to 
more traditional and conservative family patterns. Much like the mental model of pensions as an 
insurance, it leaves alternative ways of financing and many problematic aspects of capital-funded 
and private schemes as well as problematic aspects of the family as a major welfare provider out 
of the picture. 
However, there are also other vicious cycles outside of this demographic cycle. The same strategy 
of paradigm destruction with reference to endogenous design problems is inextricably linked with 
the height of social insurance contributions in the public discussion in Germany. High social 
insurance contributions (and therefore non-wage labour costs) are said to increase the cost of 
labour for employers and therefore decrease their labour demand, ultimately producing 
unemployment. This culminates in a statement that even a small reduction of the contribution rates 
is seen as negative.  
The Social Advisory Council reminds […] that the expectations concerning the pension 
reform were not met. Only a few months again, the measures of the pension reform of 1999 
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together with an increased federal subsidy through tax revenue were expected lead to 
decreasing contributions in the intermediate-term, so the report of the council says. Instead, 
there will only be a stabilization. (FAZ, 18.7.1998) 
So even the status quo or only a small improvement of the status quo is seen as unsustainable, 
not only future challenges for example due to demographic changes. Only radical change is 
accepted in this argumentation. Of course, this also incorporates elements of selective 
communication and black boxing as the proportion of non-wage labour costs as a share of total 
labour costs and therefore also its effect on employment is drastically overemphasized, as can be 
seen in Bäcker (2008: 342). But more importantly, the depiction of such a vicious cycle can only 
exist vis-à-vis the conception of a fundamentally different system of pension provision, namely 
capital-funding and private provision. What remains unmentioned is that the alleged “burden” of the 
employers can only be reduced via private provision if employer-sided contributions are cut and 
transferred to the employees’ side, de facto reducing employees’ wages if they make use of private 
pension provision in order to compensate the cutbacks of the public pillar. This is especially 
interesting as the height of contributions is also often considered as an unacceptable burden for 
the employees (FAZ, 8.9.1998). 
But also normative strategies were used in Germany, with overall 23 identified attempts. A broad 
range of ideological repertoires are used for such normative strategies, but the reference to the 
concept of “self-responsibility” is by far the most common (14 occurrences). In addition to the 
CSU/CDU, also the social democrats take up the concept of self-responsibility. 
SPD chancellor candidate Schröder wants to take back the current pension reform through 
a “pension correction law” in the case he wins the election. In 1999, the SPD wants to start 
working on a “big pension reform”. Self-responsibility and private pension provision will gain 
more importance there. (FAZ, 21.8.1998) 
The possibility that some people cannot afford additional private insurance and therefore the 
possibility that such cutbacks in the mandatory pension insurance may actually increase old-age 
poverty remains unmentioned in this new paradigm of self-responsibility, which covered nearly all 
parties of the German political arena.  
Simultaneously, public welfare provision in general is delegitimized as “old” and not suited for a 
modern society through referring to its foundations 100 years ago and historical figures like 
Bismarck. 
The main question, what social justice means, was already solved in Germany by 
Bismarck, who tried to introduce a welfare state one hundred years ago. Such a state does 
not function according to abstract values like justice or the Christian commandment of 
neighbourly love, but rather through the unemotional and business-like principle of “tit for 
tat”, “Do ut des”. Wolfgang Schäubele has called this once reciprocal altruism, where others 
take care of you in the expectations that they will be treated similarly. That is, at least in this 
country, the hard and dry core of everything “social”. And with that principle, the state failed. 
Even defenders of the social [principle], who always deny it, prove through their own 
reforms that collective insurance cannot be trusted anymore. Care insurance, the last 
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masterpiece of the welfare-industry, was only necessary because the pay-as-you-go 
system has not proved itself. (FAZ, 5.9.1998).  
Therefore, public welfare provision is rejected as “paternalistic”, and consequently not just as 
economically inefficient but also as morally wrong, unjust and unreligious. This is reinforced by 
neologisms “welfare-industry” or “social-bureaucracy” mentioned later in the article. Such words 
emphasize the allegedly cold and business like nature of public welfare provision, not without 
ultimately declaring its collapse. Consequently, the author also attacks the public pension system 
on its fundamentals. Not only can the system not sustain the logic of equivalence between 
contributions and benefits, but mandatory insurance based on this equivalence principle is 
depicted as unjust, therefore rejecting the overall conception of such a public system. 
However, the author does not stop there, he directly attacks the principle of solidarity which “differs 
from its Christian predecessor [neighbourly love] mainly through the fact that it willingly demands, 
but reluctantly gives” (ib.).  Another ideological repertoire used is the one of “thrift” which would be 
contradicted by the current system which promotes consumption. Basically, Adam uses existing 
religious and ideological repertoires in order to delegitimize the public pension system and one of 
its main ideological pillars (solidarity), which is allegedly incompatible with superior values and 
moral beliefs (neighbourly love, thrift) which he sees as “just”. Such a strategy is targeted to depict 
the pension system as fundamentally and subjectively wrong in the eyes of the majority of the 
population. Accepting the system can be understood as rejecting those “superior” values and 
beliefs, while political action in favour of privatization and capital-funding encouraged and depicted 
as “just”.  
The most important feature of the individual [private pension] insurance is that it is 
individually agreed based on civil law, and that individual premiums are based on insured 
risk and benefits. Why should that be unjust or unsocial? In public social insurance, there 
are no risk-adjusted premiums. Contributions are based on the requirements of politically 
wanted, and basically of course necessary means of social compensation. The design of 
contributions and benefits is – in contrast to individual insurance with guaranteed benefits 
according to contract – completely at the disposition of the legislator. Such redistribution by 
law does not exist in the individual insurance, and this is what makes it different to social 
insurance. The belief that those differences in the [public] social insurance necessarily lead 
to social justice is a social romantic legend and as untrue as the claim that individual 
insurance would be unsocial or unjust. Looking at the public pension system and comparing 
contributions of the young and middle aged generations with their future benefits, it is hard 
to detect any social justice. (FAZ, 15.9.1998) 
Through reference on allegedly too high contributions, it is well visible here that cognitive and 
normative strategies are often mixed. Private pension provision is here depicted as socially just as. 
The state, and therefore democratic decision making, is depicted as incapable to provide social 
justice, basically writing off the welfare state’s capability to fulfil one of its most basic purposes. 
This line of argumentation is suggesting that public pension provision would be redundant or even 
more harmful as market-based solutions (based on individuals and self-responsibility) already 
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provide sufficient social justice. Market-based solutions are reframed as socially just and fair, 
restrained by public forms of welfare provision.  
Ultimately, we can see contrasting understandings of the ideological repertoire of “justice” among 
normative discursive strategies in Germany. For example, one author promotes business-like 
principles which another author rejected as unjust. This depicts two ideological strands of criticism 
on public pay-as-you-go pensions which also have different understandings of justice. On the one 
hand the liberal critique in the article of the 15th of September, depicting the pension system as 
unjust due to its redistributive, allegedly uneconomic (and therefore unjust) elements, while on the 
other hand, the critique in the article of the 5th September comes from a much more conservative 
world-view, arguing that the public pension system destroyed traditional family forms, thrift and 
Christian neighbourly love. But both favour a redesign of the pension system towards privatization, 
and both are using normative strategies through referring on the same ideological repertoire of 
“justice”.   
5.1.1.2.  The lack of a discoursive struggle against pension privatization: 
no opposing discoursive actors 
Like already outlined, all parties except the PDS (which appears in the data on only one occasion) 
supported privatization up to a certain extent in the forefront of the elections of 1998. This means 
that there was no systematic opposition to the hegemonic discourse and therefore also no 
systematic attempts for a discursive struggle in favour of a strong public pension pillar. However, 
there were occasional attempts from actors within the CDU/CSU which tried to reframe public 
pensions in a more positive light. One of the most important discoursive entrepreneurs in this 
regard was clearly Norbert Blüm. “No system of pension provision is so successful as the German 
model” (FAZ, 22.8.1998), so the minister of labour in the conservative-liberal government and 
traditionalist with regard to welfare provision argued. However, such statements were not often 
present in the media, making a strategy of de-thematization through “staying on message” 
impossible, with only 6 attempts identified in the data. Exemplary of the public discussion is a 
statement which originally proposes other forms of reform outside increased capital-funding and 
privatization, namely promoting a higher fertility rate through measures within the pension system 
but unsurprisingly ends propagating capital-funded pensions. 
A family with two kids gains six earning points [in the pension insurance]. This makes clear 
that the dimension of such a financial compensation is only moderate and does not bear the 
dangers always mentioned in the discussion. It is a mechanism of financial compensation 
which is necessary in a pay-as-you-go system based on upcoming generations. Of course, 
a capital-funded system would be better. But complaining does not help: a political 
consensus is impossible. (FAZ, 29.8.1998) 
So even some of those partly defending the public system are caught in the hegemonic discourse 
about pension systems which fundamentally frames public pensions as in every aspect inferior to 
private and capital-funded provision.  
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However, as can be seen in this statement, a discussion about alternative ways of financing the 
pension system was indeed visible in the public debate. Such a discussion may negate the 
hegemonic doctrine that privatization and change to capital-funding is without an alternative. Of 
course, the discussion about an expansion of the federal subsidy generally depicted the public 
pension system in a negative light. Also plans for an increased share of tax-financing like proposed 
by the Greens is only mentioned in interplay with a reduction of higher earners’ pensions (FAZ, 
24.9.1998). But there were also other ideas of alternative financing. One of those was the 
expansion of social insurance contributors (9 occurrences in the data) through lowering the income 
limit for social-insurance free employment circumstances, like proposed by both the CDU and the 
SPD (Bild, 21.7.1998, FAZ, 11.8.1998), or the inclusion of the self-employed in the social 
insurance, like proposed by the trade unions and the SPD (FAZ, 26.8.1998). But the most 
important idea of financing in the respect is the discussion about promoting fertility through the 
pension system as mentioned in the earlier quoted statement, namely through Aufkindern and 
Abkindern (16 occurrences), which means lowering social insurance contributions or raising 
benefits for those with children and/or raising social insurance contributions or reducing benefits for 
those without children. This debate directly addresses the so-called demographic vicious cycle 
which was already mentioned earlier in this text. Those who have children would support the 
pension system as their children are future contributors, therefore counteracting the whole 
demographic change – so at least the logic behind the idea. There was of course also a normative 
side of this discussion. 
There is still great injustice between those who have children, and those who stay childless. 
Also the pension system has to take account of that when times of budgetary problems are 
over. Accrediting times of child rearing is the right approach. It has to be further developed. 
This holds for the level of benefits, as well as for the level of contributions. (Bild, 28.7.1998).  
The ideological repertoire of justice is here applied to the pension system, framing equal treatment 
of childless couples as unjust towards those who have children and therefore “support” the pension 
system. We can clearly see that this familiarist and anti-individualist attitude in favour of Auf- or 
Abkindern supports conservative values, but can be found in many corners of the political 
spectrum. Proponents of ideas of Auf- and Abkindern do not generally share a similar opinion on 
privatization, with for example the Greens being in favour of both awarding those with children and 
increased privatization (Bild, 6.7.1998), while president Roman Herzog was a defender of public 
pay-as-you-go pensions” (Bild, 28.7.1998). Other discoursive entrepreneurs were in favour of 
awarding those with children but generally heavily attacked public pension insurance in general 
(FAZ, 5.9.1998). Nonetheless, it can be argued that positively mentioning this way of alternative 
financing nonetheless may reduce the depiction of privatization as being without any alternative. 
However, this debate also had a highly controversial factor as newspaper commentators and the 
liberals displayed Auf- and Abkindern as population policy. Population policy has a negative 
connotation in German discourse as it is often seen in the context of national socialism. 
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Historically, the current issue of low fertility rates began to influence policy makers in Western 
Europe as early as in the 1930s, as the Baby Boom was only a small intermezzo in the broader 
trend of falling fertility rates (Demeny 2003: 10-16). “Pro-natalist” policies relied on a variety of 
instruments, including exhortations, social welfare spending for families, but also repressive 
measures like banning abortion and birth control (Finkle 2001). One of the most repressive 
population policy regimes emerged in the 1930s in national socialist Germany. Measures included 
“vigorous” pro-natalist policies for people which were thought to be of Aryan race, while people 
regarded as “hereditarily unfit” or “racially impure” were sterilized or even killed (Finkle 2001). This 
still has implications for current policies and their political discourse in Austria and Germany, and 
population policy promoting fertility has still a slightly negative undertone today (Hara 2003: 182). 
One author takes up such arguments in the FAZ: 
One can only warn from such plans. The pension system would suffer a financial death; 
would they be introduced. Connecting financial compensation for child rearing with the 
earnings-related pension insurance would be another step towards illuminating publicly 
driven redistribution. The consequence would be a hardly bearable discrimination of those 
childless. But more importantly: Auf- or Abkindern in the pension formula stands in the 
shadow of the [national-socialist] mother cross ideology. (FAZ, 21.8.1998) 
Therefore, the author argues against such a policy through referring to normative ideological 
repertoires like anti-fascism, democracy, liberty and equality. Consequently, such attempts can be 
identified as normative discursive strategies. But it has to be repeated that this debate was, while 
being one of the main determinants of the public discussion in the forefront of the elections, 
generally not for or against privatization, as both groups of proponents and opponents of Auf- and 
Abkindern had no uniform opinions on privatization and capital-funding and also rarely articulated 
them in such articles. However, it may have nonetheless influenced public debate as it showed 
other alternative ways of financing public pensions.  
5.1.2.  Early 2001: Privatization uncontested, reform under fire 
(Altersvermögensergänzungsgesetz)  
As the German government lacked a clear majority in the Germany’s second chamber, the 
Bundesrat, they decided to split the pension reform proposal into two parts. The first part of the 
German pension reform of 2001 (Altersvermögensergänzungsgesetz, AVmEG) passed the 
parliament on the 26th of January. One month before (and 1 day after) this date will be analysed. 
Overall, after a keyword search and the subsequent selection process, 81 articles were gathered 
and constitute the data to be analysed for this period12. In the forefront of the pension reform of 
2001, media coverage was quite intensive. This can be seen also in the amount of relevant articles 
                                               
12 It was searched for articles containing one of the following keywords: Pensionssystem, Rentenreform, 
Rentenversicherung, Altersversorgung, Altersvorsorge, Alterssicherung, Rentenniveau, Betriebsrente, Riesterrente, 
Riester-Rente, "Riester Rente", "Eichel Rente", Entgeldumwandlung, "Eichel-Rente", "Durchführungsweg", 
"Tarifvorbehalt", Zusatzrente, Rentenpolitik. 
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found in the month before the reform, which even surpasses the amount of relevant articles in the 
3 months before the election of 1998. The biggest actor group emerging is clearly the SPD with 25 
mentions, followed by the CDU/CSU with 19 mentions, “experts” with 8 mentions and the Green 
party as well as labour unions with 7 mentions respectively. Like in the election of 1998, the 
biggest government party (SPD) has the most mentions. What has changed is the decreasing 
coverage about “experts”, as well as a (slightly) increased importance of labour unions in the 
discourse. Comparing this period and the period before the elections of 1998, not much has 
changed in the public media coverage about pension reform. Advocates of structural change and 
privatization are still the main opinion leaders, without any significant counter-discourse. Other 
reform options have further lost relevance in the public debate. However, the pro-privatization 
advocates have mostly split in two competing camps. On the one side are the defenders of the 
government’s reform package, on the other side mostly supporters of the opposition (FDP and 
CSU/CDU, but not PDS) which picture the reform as not going far enough, therefore advocating 
more drastic cutbacks and privatization.  
Like in the election period, cognitive strategies could be observed as the mostly used ones. 
Comparatively seen, deliberate de-thematization clearly gained importance and was observed in 
17 cases, and was mostly used by the radical privatization supporters. Apart from already 
described attempts of de-thematization showed in earlier chapters, more radical discursive 
entrepreneurs leaning towards the opposition parties are for example discrediting the pension 
forecasts of the government as too optimistic and demanding even more radical reforms.  
The benefits of the public pension pillar are insufficiently retrenched; the tendency of rising 
contributions remains. At the same time, it gets more difficult to communicate the 
importance of supplementary private pension provision to the citizens. A strong incentive is 
dropped, only subsidization remains. One can guess that the subsidy pot has to become 
more and more generous over the years. (FAZ, 29.12.2000) 
As visible, such statements are also often linked to a liberal critique on the concept of 
subsidization. This way of argumentation does not only provide the opposition a tool to delineate 
themselves from the government and delegitimizing the governments’ policies without sacrificing 
their own political goals (privatization and capital-funding), but also pave the way for further reform. 
However, this is also one form of deconstruction as the discoursive entrepreneurs also show 
elements which are usually left out of the picture by government advocates, namely the costs of 
subsidization. Additionally, they can picture the current coalition as being “dishonest”, again 
referring to the picture of a lying politician who is not telling the population the (uncomfortable) 
truth, therefore discrediting their political opponents and their reform: 
It was honest to mention the necessity of private pension provision. It was dishonest to 
promise a replacement rate of 67 percent of net wages. It was dishonest announce a 22 
percent cap for pension contributions. (Bild 27.1.2001) 
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Therefore, such attempts do not only have a cognitive side, but also try to take up normative 
ideological repertoires like honesty in order to picture privatization as not only rational, but also the 
right thing to do13. On the other hand, government advocates did not make use of de-thematization 
strategies substantially, with only 4 of the 17 cases originating from this camp. However, they 
somehow tried to boost their legislation through positively emphasizing the (in the eyes of the 
opposition) too low cutback, therefore trying to reframe them as one of the positive aspects of the 
reform:  
The reduction of the replacement rate to 67 instead of 64 percent “should not make a 
difference for the creation of the capital-funded pension provision”, so the minister expects. 
Of course would the incentives be stronger in the face of a darker future. But the 
replacement rate, a not so unproblematic benchmark, should not be strained. (FAZ, 
29.12.2000) 
Scientific objectification was identified 10 times, which happens only through seemingly neutral 
international comparison here. Advocates of more radical reform use such international 
comparison to discredit the new implementation channel in occupational pensions, pension funds 
(Pensionsfonds), as too strictly regulated, through comparing it to allegedly successful and far 
more liberal legislation in other countries:  
It is good that the government has taken up on the issue of pension funds. But they do it to 
hectically, and they construct something which has nothing to do with the successful 
models from America or the Netherlands. (FAZ, 24.1.2001) 
Such statements are often presented as neutral observations, however, they are subjective first 
and foremost in the ways in which they withhold information and make certain assumptions 
(“selective communication” and “black boxing”). Possible advantages of the planned German 
legislation like increased shareholder security are often not even considered, as well as possible 
downsides of foreign legislation. Furthermore, international success stories are ‘cherry picked’ and 
presented as a universal strategy suitable for every country – including Germany. That a different 
institutional context may be responsible for the success of such deregulated pension funds in 
liberal market economies, like outlined in the varieties of capitalism literature (cf. chapter 3.2), is 
not considered.  
Dramatization clearly lost importance and is only present with 7 occurrences in the data, with 
arguments which are largely consistent with those in the election period.  Selective communication 
is also of less importance, with 6 identified occurrences in the data. However, there a few 
interesting new arguments visible in those strategies. One concerns the split of contributions 
between employers and employees.  
                                               
13 However, for the purpose of including those strategies in quantitative statistics, they are considered as knowledge 
market closure and therefore cognitive discoursive strategies in this paper.  
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Even in the case that 200 000 people immigrate in the near future, it will take by far higher 
contributions than today to finance the money necessary for pension provision. In principle, 
it does not matter if that happens through contributions or taxes or through both. Some 
think, that the employers should pay more. However, those people forget that everybody is 
also paying for the employers’ contributions, which are costs for them, through the prices 
for goods and services. The only thing that really helps is thrift. (FAZ, 6.1.2001) 
This would suggest that a lower contribution rate would automatically lead to lower prices. 
Unmentioned remains the underlying assumption of totally flexible prices. However, even 
contemporary academic studies which advocate a reduction of nonwage labour costs like a study 
by Walterskirchen et al. (2000) mention that prices are relatively sticky concerning a downward 
adjustment, and that a full price adjustment is unlikely.  
Also the so called dependency ratio is now explicitly subject to debate, while demographic change 
was earlier only more abstractly depicted as a threat without reference to such an academic 
concept.  
During the last 30 years, the so called old-age dependency ratio, which is the relationship 
between the generation in retirement age to the generations in working age, remained 
roughly the same, but in the coming 50 years a constant increase of this ratio up to two-
times of its current value has to be expected. Only if a larger part of those in retirement age 
remains in employment, the problems of the public pension pillar can be reduced at least to 
some degree. (FAZ, 29.12.2000) 
With this statement, the author has allegedly proven the unsustainability of the public pension 
system based on more or less objective and neutral facts. He then later emphasizes the need for 
private pension provision and cutbacks: 
The long-term goal of a reform of the German pension system should include the creation 
of basic security [at old age] for everyone in employment - or even better, for the whole 
population (like in Switzerland) - supplemented by employment specific, occupational or 
individual private forms of pension provision on the basis of a public regulatory framework. 
(Faz, 29.12.2000) 
The technical explanation of the dependency ratio is true: the demographic old-age dependency 
ratio usually divides the number of people with an age of 65 or higher by the number of people 
from 15 to 64. The higher the ratio, the more people are over the age of 65 relative to those under 
this age. However, its interpretation is incomplete and selective, as the demographic dependency 
ratio is not suitable to analyse the sustainability of pension systems. Conclusions derived from the 
demographic dependency ratio may be biased by presupposing that certain cohorts and therefore 
age groups automatically engage in several normatively accepted and socially obligatory activities. 
For example, people may tend to think that all individuals between the age of 15 and 64 work and 
are therefore in employment, while every person of age 65 and over is thought to be in retirement. 
Dannefer (2001) emphasizes such ascribed characteristics of age, as our definition of an adult or 
an elderly also come with expectations of capabilities and obligations of those people. However, 
those normative age-graded roles are not consistent with reality and furthermore assume 
hypothetical economic situations like full employment. This becomes especially problematic if we 
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want to derive the financial sustainability of the welfare state (and in particular the pension system) 
from the demographic dependency ratio, as the government budget and the social security system 
is usually financed by contributions of the working population, and not by all people between the 
age of 15 and 64. Authors like Türk and Wöss (2011) or Eurofound (2012: 21) therefore argue that 
the concept of the demographic dependency ratio is inadequate for comparing the working 
population to the non-working population and cannot capture the sustainability of the welfare state 
as it (per definition) only refers to the population out of working age relative to people in working 
age. It totally neglects that there are many people in the working age who are currently not working 
(and receive unemployment benefits) as well as people over the age of 65 who still work (and pay 
contributions). Consequently, the demographic dependency ratio allows no comprehensive 
analysis of the future costs of pension systems nor the welfare state in general. Alternative 
indicators like the economic dependency ratio which are not using age groups but are rather 
separating analytical categories according to economic status usually show much more optimistic 
scenarios concerning the future of public pension systems (Wöss/Türk 2011, Wöss/Türk 2014).  
Finally, the wording in the analysed newspapers is quite misleading concerning the nature of the 
implemented private pension provision, also resulting in selective communication. Often, an 
increase of the private pension provision is simply presumed without acknowledging the possibility 
that many individuals, especially with low income, may not even make use of the private pension 
pillars, therefore possibly creating old-age poverty. While this possibility is usually totally omitted 
from the debate, certain sentences may create the misleading image of a quasi-mandatory private 
pension provision. For example, at the day of the reform, the Bild wrote: “Today, the parliament will 
decide on the pension reform. Most important aspect: in the future, we also have to save privately 
for retirement” (Bild, 26.1.2001). The day after, they state: “The contribution rate [for private 
pensions] should increase from 1 percent of gross wages (2001) to 4 percent of gross wages 
(2008)” (Bild 27.1.2001). Also a month before, the Bild argued “The government wants to commit 
us to use private pension provision” (Bild, 29.12.2000).  
Paradigm destruction remains important, with overall 23 occurrences, from which 15 refer to 
exogenous change (demographic aging) and 8 construct a vicious cycle (mostly referring to too 
high pension contributions). Generally, the arguments used do not differ from those in the election 
period.  However, what is also visible here is the accusation that government reforms will not be 
able to decrease the height of contributions to the extent the government promised, again 
emphasizing that the reform would be not radical enough: “In the face of the expected 
demographic developments, a permanent reduction of the burden of pension contributions appears 
to be surreal if the replacement rate is only reduced to 68 percent” (FAZ, 16.1.2001).  
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Figure 5: Mostly used discoursive strategies in favour of privatization and capital-funding in 
Germany in early 2001 (1 month) 
 
Normative strategies are still used with overall 27 observations, but are broadly split between 
different ideological repertoires. Mostly used is still the repertoire of “self-responsibility” (and 
therefore also anti-paternalism, 11 occurrences), but mainly from the camp of radical privatizers, 
which picture the planned regulation for private pensions as too strict: “[Former economic secretary 
of state Johann Eekhoff] suspects that the ‘enormous bureaucratic control apparatus’ only exists 
for constraining the citizens' choices concerning private pension provision" (FAZ, 20.1.2001). Much 
like the public pension system in the period of election, the planned reform towards privatization is 
now pictured as paternalistic, and therefore not only inefficient but morally wrong: “The attempts for 
creating capital-funded private pensions are insufficient. Too tight regulation is patronizing the 
citizen” (FAZ, 22.1.2001). Consequently, those discursive actors use the same strategy for 
demanding further privatization and more radical reform as they did before in delegitimizing public 
pensions. Interestingly, such accusations are again often connected to some sort of welfare-
annihilating and overly bureaucratic leviathan state. 
“Fairness and justice” is also often used in early 2001 (7 occurrences), mostly in the sense of 
“generational justice”. Both government as well as opposition advocates try to make use of this 
repertoire.  
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The pension reform must be and will be introduced in 2001. The reform will distribute the 
burden of an aging society equally on old and young. That is just. Pensions will rise after a 
modified gross wage adjustment around the same amount as income, from the 1st of July 
2001 presumably by 2.1 percent in east and west. I pledge to all those politically 
responsible to reach a broad consensus concerning this pension reform. It increases trust 
in the pension system. (Bild, 27.12.2000) 
The understanding of the concept of generational justice is connected to several aspects and 
underwent severe change since the end of WW2, as Brettschneider (2009) outlined. Due to the 
rather low importance of this ideological repertoire in the observed media, attention will be focused 
here on two aspects, which appear to be of direct relevance with respect to the analysed articles. 
First of all, generational justice is here used by a discoursive entrepreneur in order to justify 
cutbacks of the public pension system. Lower contributions and subsequently pension cuts for the 
current generation of pensioners, so the argument goes, would release the burden of demographic 
aging from the younger generation. The interests of the younger generation are only constituted as 
paying the lowest possible contributions to the pension system. However, what is completely 
neglected here is that current contributors will also be retired one day and will be also negatively 
affected by the cutbacks imposed to the pension system today, like Ebert (2005: 23) outlines.  
Second, the usage of generational justice here drastically overemphasizes the role of public 
pension systems for intergenerational economic transfers (ib.: 21f.), therefore redistribution from 
the young to the old generation and subsequently neglects transfers from old to young (nurturing, 
education, infrastructure, heritages).  This leads to the shallow conclusion that the pension system 
is the sole mechanisms of generational justice and would therefore have to be drastically adjusted 
for the benefits of the young generation in the face of demographic change. A more sophisticated 
discussion on generational justice, especially concerning its different understandings is provided 
for example in Ebert (2005) or Leisering (2000). Those authors tackle the issue of generational 
justice as justice and equality between simultaneously living age groups (old and young) versus 
justice and equality between age cohorts and therefore justice and equality between their individual 
rates of return in the pension system. The latter understanding gained dominance in in the late 
1990s and was used to justify lower contributions and/or benefits.  
Same as in the election period, a consistent discoursive struggle against the paradigm of 
privatization and capital-funding is not visible in the period before the early 2001 reform, which 
does not come as a surprise considering that traditionalist Norbert Blüm dropped out as minister of 
labour after the elections of 1998. Cognitive strategies are visible only in attempts which curb the 
enthusiasm for capital-funding and privatization a little bit, without clearly arguing against it: “I 
recommend only using products which are under strong public regulations, and not letting oneself 
be blinded by promises for enormous rates of return” (FAZ, 2.1.2001). Overall, only 10 attempts of 
using cognitive strategies could be identified, including such strategies which do not clearly argue 
against reform. The only organized actor sceptical of privatization and capital-funding in the public 
 59 
 
discourse are the PDS and the labour unions, mostly arguing through normative strategies. 
However, not much space is given to such statements in the media coverage, resulting in only 
sketchy statements. For example, both PDS and IG Metal declare that the pension reform would 
be unsocial (FAZ, 30.12.2000, 2.1.2001). 
Concerning this question, they [the party] would have another opinion as the coalition 
partner SPD in the federal state government, so the PDS’ federal group chairman Gramkow 
said in Schwerin on Monday. She articulated the fear that the reform will lead to the 
withdrawal of employers from solidaristic pension provision. (FAZ, 23.1.2001) 
As visible above, the PDS goes one step further. Not only is the reform itself declared as unsocial, 
but it is displayed as a threat to the principles of the current pension system itself (“solidarity”). 
Furthermore, they try to construct a class struggle in the reform legislation, with the capital side 
(the employer) ultimately prevailing if the reform passes. However, much like in the cognitive 
ideological repertoires mentioned above, the positions of labour unions are generally, at least in 
the public media coverage, not clearly directed against capital-funding and privatization, but rather 
address the split of contributions between employees and employers (FAZ, 25.1.2001). On overall 
6 occurrences, such normative strategies were used.  
Similar are also attempts by opposition parties to attack the reform because of other aspects of the 
reform which are generally not connected to pension privatization and capital-funding. One of 
those aspects of the discourse is again a discussion about Aufkindern and Abkindern (7 
occurrences), which may be seen a form of alternative financing and was already discussed in the 
last chapter. A similar position has the discussion about a retrenchment of early retirement 
legislation, which may also be seen as a form of alternative financing with overall 6 occurrences. 
However, such discussions are usually not depicted as an alternative to the reform by the 
discoursive entrepreneurs, but as a necessary supplement:  
The introduction of a supplementary private pension provision, which is subsidized or tax 
exempt, was called a quantum leap forward by [SPD general secretary] Müntefering. 
Müntefering advocated for prolonging the lifetime spend in work, otherwise the pension 
system would face financial problems soon again. (FAZ, 8.1.2001) 
The picture of a “lying politician”, presenting the governments reform as dishonest, was also 
observed a couple of times in articles which do not show a specific positive or negative orientation 
towards privatization and capital funding (9 occurrences). Another huge topic was subsidization of 
property ownership within private pension provision (17 occurrences), which mainly split the 
privatization supporters again in two camps. However, a further elaboration of this discourse strand 
will be omitted here as it appears to be of rather low relevance in answering the research question 
of this paper.  
All those debates elaborated in the last paragraph generally do not attack the paradigm of 
privatization and capital funding. This does not mean that there was an overall political consensus 
for the specific reform of the government, as opposition politicians had multiple reasons for voting 
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against it, including critique on minor details which helped those parties to delineate themselves 
from their political competition. However, the general direction of reform (towards capital funding 
and privatization) was unquestioned in the public discourse, even if the reform itself was criticized 
by the opposition for abovementioned reasons. 
5.1.3.  Mid 2001: Passing the Bundesrat 
The second part of the pension reform (Altersvermögensgesetz, AVmG), which additionally 
necessitated a majority in the Bundesrat, was approved on the 11th of May. Again, one month 
before (and 1 day after) this date will be analysed. Overall, after a keyword search and the 
subsequent selection process, 70 articles were gathered and constitute the data to be analysed for 
this period, which is (compared to the election period) again substantial14. The biggest actor group 
emerging is clearly again the SPD with 24 mentions, followed by the CDU/CSU with 15 mentions 
and the Green party with 10 mentions. Small opposition parties gained relevance again, which 
might be connected to government participation in several federal states, making them important 
partners for getting the reform through the second chamber (Bundesrat).  Therefore, the FDP is 
mentioned 9 times and the PDS 9 times. Experts appear in 7 articles. 
In this month before the final approval of the reform in the Bundesrat, this struggle on minor details 
relatively unconnected to privatization and capital-funding becomes increasingly dominant in public 
media coverage. Discussion about the main principles of the reform, namely capital-funding and 
privatization, has become a secondary in the discourse. In the election period and in early 2001, 
privatization and capital-funding where seen as dominant and there were clear attempts visible to 
frame them as not only necessary, but also the right thing to do. Now those topics have lost 
relevance, and other details of the reform are highlighted and increasingly questioned by the 
opposition, which will be discussed in the end of this chapter. First, the remaining cognitive and 
normative strategies for framing private and capital-funded pensions in this time period will be 
outlined. 
Selective communication is the mostly used cognitive strategy in this period (11 occurrences). New 
here is the framing of the height of contributions as not only a problem for employment and 
economic stability, but also for the employee because of the relatively unimaginative claim that the 
contributions would eat up a too large proportion of the wage. The fact that individuals will have to 
spend an increasing proportion of their wage for private pension provision in order to compensate 
pension cuts is not mentioned by any party present in the public discourse. Such strategies reduce 
the complexity of paradigm destruction strategies usually used to present the need for low 
                                               
14 It was searched for articles containing one of the following keywords: Pensionssystem, Rentenreform, 
Rentenversicherung, Altersversorgung, Altersvorsorge, Alterssicherung, Rentenniveau, Betriebsrente, Riesterrente, 
Riester-Rente, "Riester Rente", "Eichel Rente", Entgeldumwandlung, "Eichel-Rente", "Durchführungsweg", 
"Tarifvorbehalt", Zusatzrente, Rentenpolitik. 
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contributions in a much more graspable way, highlighting allegedly positive effects for the majority 
of the population. 
All pensioners are winners [of this reform], as they get exclusively higher benefits, so 
Schröder said. The working population is also a winner because their contributions to the 
pension system are stabilized. Schröder explicitly praised his minister of labour. Against 
resistance, Riester would have introduced a “large-scale reform”.  (FAZ, 12.5.2001). 
Relatively often used is also de-thematization (10 occurrences), where we can observe an 
increasing will of government proponents to frame the reform in a generous and positive light, 
playing down cutbacks and delegitimizing any attack based on too low pension benefits, as can 
also be seen in the quote above. Of course, such claims depend on a lot of different (unstated) 
factors like interest rates (cf. chapter 5.1.1) – however, the opposition usually uses other means of 
attacking the reform which do not criticize capital-funding on its principles, like alleging the 
government to use unrealistic assumptions about immigration or demographic change. Also 
interesting is media coverage about the PDS, as it was the only party which fundamentally rejected 
capital-funding and privatization. In this observed period, the PDS is relatively often mentioned in 
the media in connection to the pension reform, now with even 7 articles. It is stunning that in none 
of those articles, the reasons of the PDS’ rejection of the pension reform is mentioned. Only one 
article at least mentions those reasons implicitly.  
In the last days before the ballot concerning the last part of the pension reform, the PDS so 
openly and repeatedly articulated their refusal; one could have guessed that they want to 
get over the fear of being persuaded otherwise at the very last minute in the Bundesrat. The 
PDS justifies its rejection of the reforms through arguments concerning the content of the 
reform, but the reasons also have to be sought inside the PDS. (FAZ, 11.5.2001) 
Consequently, none of the arguments concerning the content of the reform are mentioned, while 
the rejection of the reform is depicted solely as a matter of party politics. Therefore, this can be 
seen as a type of deliberate de-thematization, somehow also delegitimizing the PDS’ rejection of 
the reform.  Dramatization (4 occurrences) as well as scientific objectification (6 occurrences) does 
not differ much from the attempts already used in the two observed periods earlier and is relatively 
unimportant in this period.  The same holds for paradigm destruction, with 5 observed attempts 
referring to vicious cycles and 4 attempts referring to exogenous change.  
Normative strategies remain important, with overall 21 attempts. Again, the ideological repertoire of 
“fairness and justice” is used most often (9 occurrences), but besides generational justice, another 
aspect is now introduced, namely distributional justice. The old public pension system is framed as 
unsocial und unjust through the argumentation that only rich people could afford private pensions 
in such a system. In contrast, a subsidization of private pensions as in the new system would allow 
also poorer people to make use of private pension provision. 
The transition from a pure pay-as-you-go system towards a mixture of public and private 
pension provision was urgently required to break the eternal cycle of increasing 
contributions and decreasing benefits. The public subsidy now gives everybody the chance 
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to make use of interest rate effects, also small-wage earners. Therefore, with help of the 
tax-payer, everybody now has a chance to plan a save and affordable pension provision, 
which roughly corresponds to the benefit level of a current pensioner. (FAZ, 12.5.2001).  
Other statements also refer to such an argumentation, therefore being especially directed at 
critique from the left, which is visible in other statements like “It would be an afterwit if of all parties 
the PDS would prevent support for the weak [through private pension subsidization]” (FAZ, 
8.5.2001). Fair and just is here what gives everybody the same chances and equal opportunities 
(equality), and not what leads to equal results (equity). That especially persons will lower income 
are unlikely to make use of private pensions due to their voluntary nature, which leads to 
substantial coverage gaps (Schmähl 2007, Meyer 2015: 189), is completely neglected here. A 
subsidization may lead to marginally higher private pension coverage for those with lower income, 
but full coverage is even more unlikely than for those with higher income, and together with the 
public cutbacks, an overall lower benefit level has to be expected for this income group. Self-
responsibility is the second most used ideological repertoire, occurring 8 times in the data. 
Like already mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, other details besides capital-funding and 
privatization are now in the centre of public discussion about the pension reform. Besides topics 
already present in the previous two periods like Auf- and Abkindern (9 occurrences) and the 
subsidization of property ownership (19 occurrences), discussions about widow pensions are now 
increasingly covered in the media (11 occurrences). Changes in widow pensions are harshly 
criticized especially by the CDU/CSU, however such critique does not address privatization or 
capital-funding, therefore a further discussion of this topic will be omitted here. Nearly no 
opposition to the principle of capital-funding and privatization is visible in this period, with only 7 
cognitive and 3 normative strategies used.  Such strategies again do not attack privatization and 
capital-funding directly but rather curb the enthusiasm for the reform (“"customers [of private 
pensions] will be faced by quite demanding decisions", FAZ, 25.4.2001) or highlight the cutbacks 
("Pensioners, that becomes more and more clear, are amongst the losers of the red-green 
reforms", Bild, 17.4.2001). 
5.2.  Austria 
5.2.1.  The 1999 elections 
Like in the case of Germany, 3 months before the elections (and 1 day after) were analysed in 
Austria. The selection process for choosing relevant articles reduces the overall number of articles 
to be gathered to 71 and constitutes the data to be analysed for this period15. In contrast to the 
                                               
15 The search has been conducted for articles containing one of the following keywords: Alterssicherung, 
Pensionsreform, Pensionsversicherung, Altersvorsorge, "prämienbegünstigte Zukunftsvorsorge", "prämienbegünstigte 
Pensionsvorsorge", Pensionssystem, Pensionsvorsorge, Zukunftsvorsorge, Pensionskassen, Betriebspensionen, 
Abfertigung, Pensionsniveau. Adding additional search instruments for filtering articles with at least two occurrences of 
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discussion in Germany, the Austrian pension system was initially only a very minor part of the 
public discussion in the forefront of the elections in 1999. However, the discussion started to heat 
up around 3 weeks before the election, as can be seen in Figure 6. There are 3 main actors, rather 
groups of actors, in the discussion about pension reform in Austria. The first group is called 
“experts” and includes all actors which are depicted as experts by the media. The most significant 
individuals within that group were the two economists Bert Rürup and Erich Streissler, both in 
favour of privatization. Statements or references to the group of experts are given in 31 of the 
relevant articles, making it the biggest of all actor groups. The second group of actors is the social-
democratic party of Austria (SPÖ) and their associated organizations (mainly the association of 
social democratic retirees), being present in 24 of all relevant articles and holding a clearly pro-
public position with regard to the pension system. This order of actors holds for both Kronen-
Zeitung and Die Presse, which is insofar surprising as Die Presse is generally regarded to have a 
more conservative editorial policy. The Christian-democratic ÖVP follows rather distantly with 16 
references or statements in the media. The right-wing FPÖ is present with only 8 articles. Both of 
those latter parties lacked a clear position on pension policy. Other actor groups include the social 
partners (chamber of labour, the economic chamber, the labour union federation), the green party 
and the liberal party (LIF). Those actor groups are only present with a maximum of 5 statements or 
references in the data.  
Figure 6: Number of relevant articles according to calendar weeks before the election in Austria 
 
Note: Search conducted in APA online manager library in the sources Die Presse and Kronen-Zeitung. Own 
depiction.  
 
                                                                                                                                                            
the word “Pension“ increase the number of articles in the keyword search but only marginally increase the number of 
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5.2.1.1.  Pro privatization: Attempts for discoursive change  
The hegemonic disocurse about the pension system in the elections of 1999 was initially still 
shaped by the importance of the state as a provider for old age provision. However, there were 
indeed attempts to reframe discourse about pension policy in the direction of privatization and to a 
lesser extend also capital funding (especially in the Kronen-Zeitung). The most dominant actor 
group trying to establish such a discoursive struggle was clearly the group of “experts” and 
journalists from the newspapers themselves. The parties of the future right-wing government only 
partially made statements which can be regarded as challenging the hegemonic discourse, often 
even supported it.  
The most important strategies to challenge the hegemonic discourse were clearly of cognitive 
nature, and therefore cognitive discoursive strategies. 73 statements or references given in the 
relevant articles could be identified as cognitive discoursive strategies. This then often happens 
through dramatization or scientific objectification. Dramatization was identified 29 times in the data 
and was mostly applied through using especially captivating phrases16.  
The structure of public pensions is currently in fundamental change. As widely known, the 
welfare state budget drifts continuously towards unaffordability: Constantly increasing 
contributions face constantly decreasing benefits. The system is currently like a bottomless 
pit. (Die Presse, 21.9.1999). 
Like in the article quoted above, this happens often as an introduction, sometimes also a small 
parenthesis in the article, and the message is emphasized through frequent repetition in other 
articles (“staying on message”, cf. Brettschneider 2009). A more complex technique of 
dramatization is carefully creating an emergency atmosphere, a crisis which has to be urgently 
countered. Of course, such an atmosphere of urgency is relatively hard to communicate in an 
abstract field like pension policy. Austrian discoursive entrepreneurs found a way to do so via 
depicting the demographic aging process not only as a challenge for the pension system but also 
as a challenge for the functioning of a democracy. Through lining out that through increased life 
expectancy and reduced fertility, retirees will soon be the majority of the population, the 
entrepreneurs are able to create an atmosphere of immediate urgency – “soon it will be too late”, 
so to say.  This of course relies on the assumptions that retirees or soon-to-be retirees will never 
accept pension cuts and act strictly according to their own interests – and that politicians will bow 
to this pressure.  What also happens through such a strategy is the creation of a bogeyman vis-à-
vis the youth. This is quite evident in the media, often blaming the youth to be inactive and 
therefore irresponsible for not demanding lower contributions. 
                                               
16 Other used wordings are for example exploding budgets (Die Presse, 28.7.1999), reform deadlocks (Die Presse, 
16.8.1999), approaching hard times (Die Presse, 17.9.1999), all-time highs (concerning expenses, Die Presse, 
18.9.1999), abysmal pension gaps (Die Presse, 21.9.1999), shadows of our social achievements (Die Presse, 
21.9.1999) 
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Despite Viktor Klima juggling with multi-billion Schilling numbers after his rapid recovery 
[from illness], there remains the clear and irrefutable dictum of experts: First, Austria’s 
pension system is the most expensive and least financeable pension system of the world. 
Second, the longer we wait, the more brutal it will have to get. Thinking just about this time 
period, many pensioners do not act irrational when demanding promises from the parties. 
Unreasonable is only the young and middle generation, because they put up with 
everything: This guarantee is given on their costs. For them, there will be only a ridiculous 
subsidy of 482 Schilling for building up private pensions. (Die Presse, 27.9.1999) 
Such a blaming and shaming of the young generation happens in order to form a coalition between 
self-proclaimed social policy “modernizers” and the youth. Not “reacting” is equalized with being 
irrational, cutbacks and privatization are presented as the only reasonable alternative. Such 
attempts to activate the youth can be seen in 6 articles, with 1 of them being in the Kronen-Zeitung 
(25.9.1999). 
Figure 7: Mostly used discoursive strategies in favour of privatization in Austria 
 
Another important strategy identified in the Austrian case is scientific objectification, over all being 
visible in 25 articles. The peak of relevant articles in calendar week 38 as seen in figure 6 mainly 
results from such attempts. Two events shaped this accumulation of articles which brought pension 
policy on the election agenda. The first one was a statement made by the German economist and 
advisor of both the German as well as the Austrian government Bert Rürup. As outlined earlier, 
Rürup also advised the Austrian SPÖ-ÖVP coalition on the pension reform of 1997. On the 
21.9.1999 Die Presse published an article on Rürup under the title “Public pensions have to be cut” 
which triggered widespread reactions and dominated the public debate for the next 14 days until 
the election. Like outlined by Brettschneider (2009), scientific objectification is easily possible 
through seemingly neutral international comparison. This is also visible in the article about Rürup 
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(and the respective follow-ups in both newspapers). First, Austria’s pension system is declared as 
the world’s most expensive. 
The Austrian pension system would be the world’s most expensive, even more expensive 
than the Italian one, so Bernd Rürup, advisor of the German minister of labour and 
consultant of the Austrian social ministry, just before the most recent pension reform is 
introduced. At the St.Wolfgang talks, organized by the insurance industry, the expert only 
argued that the small reform has changed nothing about this assessment.  (Die Presse, 
21.9.1999). 
Such statements are often presented as neutral observations, however, they are ideological first 
and foremost in the ways in which they withhold information and make certain assumptions 
(“selective communication” and “black boxing”).  Pension expenditures are here implicitly defined 
as public pension expenditures. A pension system as a whole however can be organized as a 
mixture of private and public provision. The article is in favour of privatization, but private pension 
expenditures are not mentioned and not regarded as pension expenditures here, therefore 
depicting private pension systems simply as cheaper than public ones. However, scientific 
objectification does not have to be extensive or somehow sophisticated. A small statement like “so 
the experts say” may be enough to give the article a scientific touch and completely change its 
importance for the reader, which happens on 5 occurrences in the data. 
Second in the article, Austria’s pension system is also presented as comparatively very generous, 
which is identified as a problem due to demographic ageing. This is also a form of paradigm 
destruction (cf. Brettschneider 2009): the pension system is regarded as unable to cope to such 
exogenous change, bringing up a reason to change its organization dramatically. This was 
identified 13 times in the data. Another form of paradigm destruction which is not present in the 
Rürup article is referring to endogenous problems of the system, arguing that the system has 
always had (fundamental) errors. However, this was identified in only 2 articles. For example, an 
article in the Kronen-Zeitung basically argues that a system based on pay-as-you-go has to 
decrease its benefits per design (not further elaborating why), and that private pensions are 
therefore absolutely necessary (Kronen-Zeitung 25.9.1999). Other lines of argumentation are that 
a pay-as-you-go system would reduce the incentive to have children (referring to a demographic 
vicious cycle like seen in the German discourse) or that it is an area far too sensible to rely on the 
state (Die Presse 2.10.1999). The propagated solution (for both endogenous as well as exogenous 
challenges) is always the same: privatization. Again, the question why a partly private system may 
be able to cope better with such exogenous challenges or why it should be overall less expensive 
remains unanswered, as well as possible empirical evidence.  
Like already mentioned, many follow-up articles were released on the statements by Rürup, even 
making it to Die Krone. All of them show ideal-typical elements scientific objectification, with 
countless descriptions of Rürup as an international pension expert. A couple of days later, Erich 
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Streissler, an economist at the University of Vienna, supported the arguments of Rürup and 
dramatized them even more.  
The situation is far more serious than Rürup suggests. Austria – with around 15 percent of 
the gross national product – does not only have the most expensive pension system in the 
world. It has also promised its pensioners the world’s highest increase of those gigantic 
benefits, and that to the disadvantage of the youth. In other words: Austria has the most 
unaffordable pension system in the World. That was found out currently by known world-
expert Laurence Kotlikoff in the leading economic journal, the American Economic Review. 
(Die Presse, 25.9.1999). 
He underpins this argument with additional international comparisons: not only would the Austrian 
system be the most expensive, but also the one with the highest rate of increase in expenses - to 
the disadvantage of the youth. And he still adds more seemingly scientific value to his statements 
by referring to the “leading” economic journal American Economic Review and “world expert” 
Laurence Kotlikoff. Financing the system in the future would necessitate cuts in social benefits by 
60 percent or a tax increase by 20 percent, so he states later in the article. And he even goes so 
far to declare the Austrian pension system to be the most unsustainable one in the world. First, this 
is again a case of black boxing and selective communication, regarding the assumptions and 
methodology of the calculations of the journal article which remain unmentioned and to the limited 
policy options presented, which for example neglect other options like increased labour market 
participation. However, it is also a classic case of negative campaigning which also incorporates 
many untrue statements. Those are later deconstructed by certain reactions from the Chamber of 
Labour and the economic research institute Wifo (outlined in the next subchapter). For example, 
the quoted journal article is outdated and refers to data and pension policy of 1995 and does not 
incorporate the reform of 1997. But Streissler also uses quite simple and so to say primitive 
methods to underpin his statement, referring to common knowledge: “You can’t spend more money 
than you have”. Apparently, sovereign debt was not part of the economic curriculum at the 
University of Vienna in 1999. As with Rürup, Streissler was frequently quoted until the election.  
However, simultaneously with the Rürup article, another discussion emerged on occupational 
pensions in Austria. Those articles are released in the same issue of Die Presse as the Rürup 
article and may therefore profit from his dramatization and negative campaigning about the public 
pension system in Austria. Occupational pensions are framed as an advantage for all or a win-win 
situation, closing the pension gap for employees but binding them to their respective employer (Die 
Presse, 21.9.1999). Overall, such attempts were identified in 5 articles. Those strategies are 
mainly used by financial market actors who of course have an interest in externally organized 
occupational pensions. Also international comparison is popular in propagating occupational 
pensions, referring to Germany as a paragon of occupational pensions, while in Austria, only a 
privileged elite would eligible. This is also interesting as in the German discourse of 2001, 
Germany was usually framed as a country with a comparatively underdeveloped occupational 
pension pillar. Ultimately, this discussion diverges from Rürup’s statement (who favours mandatory 
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private pensions), as the present voluntary occupational pensions are depicted in a positive light – 
of course then, the respective part of Rürup’s statement remains unmentioned in such articles.  
Finally, with 6 identified phrases in the data, deliberate de-thematization is another cognitive 
strategy. This is mostly applied to the idea to create the individual right to receive a pension, 
originally proposed by Karl Blecha, head of the association of social democratic retirees (Die 
Presse, 17.9.1999). This idea was taken up by Jörg Haider (FPÖ) who now suggested a 
constitutional guarantee for not cutting pensions (Die Presse, 24.9.1999). This idea was then 
quickly torn apart by various jurists because of Haider’s plans to abolish the upper ceiling of social 
insurance contributions. But the basic idea to grant a right to receive pensions was now 
delegitimized, which may have shifted the discussion away from such proposals. The SPÖ 
consequently did not take this idea up again in the media until the election.  
Normative discourse strategies were less important in the elections of 1999. Only 14 cases of 
normative strategies were identified in the data. Relatively frequent is the attempt to justify the 
privatization of the pension system through the indirect claim that it would be the only way to 
sustain or strengthen the welfare state, hinting towards the model of three pillars which the ÖVP 
proposed during the elections. 
Designated head of the Austrian economic chamber’s social policy department, Martin 
Gleitsmann, is in favour of further pension adjustments and an urgent pension reform. 
“Those in favour of the welfare state have to refine it”, so Gleitsmann said in a conversation 
with “Die Presse”. (Die Presse, 23.7.1999) 
Another popular normative strategy was to transfer the ideological repertoire of personal 
responsibility into the pension system. Public pensions were framed as not trustworthy, in contrast 
to private pensions, which were nearly even depicted as some duty for those not being naive. 
It is undemocratic when president Sallmutter states that nobody “needs” private pension 
provision. It is the right of enlightened citizens to not believe unreasonable politicians, but 
rather to provide from themselves.  (Die Presse, 25.9.1999) 
Attempts to create a new understanding of generational justice (2 occurrences) like Brettschneider 
(2009) proposed or attempts to frame private pensions in the light of equal treatment vis-à-vis 
public pensions (2 occurrences) were not relevant in the observed media.  
5.2.1.2.  Contra privatization: Strong opposing discoursive actors 
defending the hegemonic discourse  
Attempts to reframe discourse about pension policy resulted in discursive struggle with actors who 
defended the old hegemonic discourse. The main actor defending the hegemonic discourse was 
the social democratic party of Austria.  Like among proponents of private pensions, cognitive 
discourse strategies are the most frequent ones.  
Deliberate de-thematization strategies like outlined by Brettschneider (2009) are also often used by 
defendants of public pension systems (24 cases in the data). The strategy behind it is quite simple: 
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like dramatization strategies of proponents of private pensions, de-thematization strategies 
defending the hegemonic discourse rely on frequent repetition of simple statements (staying on 
message)17.   
On Tuesday, head of the economic research institute (Wifo) Helmut Kramer has depicted a 
new pension reform after the elections on the 3rd of October as inevitable. Minister of social 
affairs Lore Hostasch disagrees. At a press conference on Friday, she said that “I 
absolutely see no necessity to undertake further wide-ranging reforms.” (Die Presse, 
31.7.1999) 
What is stunning in this regard is that many of those statements are also made by the ÖVP. 
Questions concerning pensions play nearly no role in the current election campaigns. The 
coalition instantly has an explanation for that. “Because of the measures which have 
already been undertaken, for years to come, pensions are no budgetary problem anymore”, 
so the ÖVP spokesman for social affairs Gottfried Feurstein. (Die Presse, 18.9.1999)  
Such statements come from the party which at the same time also officially promoted a reform 
towards a three-pillar pension system, therefore totally delegitimizing their pro-privatization and 
capital-funding strategies. Blecha (SPÖ) also referred to Austria as a “rich country” multiple times, 
which could afford a generous pension system (Die Presse, 18.9.1999), drawing the attention 
away from the atmosphere of crisis created by opposing discoursive actors.  
Figure 8: Mostly used discoursive strategies against privatization in Austria 
 
                                               
17 Other examples are “fearmongering among pensioners” (Die Presse, 28.9.1999) and “unpredictability as the main 
principle of [oppositional pension] policy” (Kronen-Zeitung, 22.9.1999). 
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The second most popular strategy (identified 14 times in the data) is what I call paradigm defence - 
acting as some sort of counterpart to Brettschneider’s (2009) paradigm destruction. Paradigm 
defence was applied 8 times through mentioning alternative means of financing for the pension 
system in order to withstand exogenous challenges like demographic ageing. Examples for such 
alternative are increased labour market participation (especially for women) (Kronen-Zeitung, 
18.9.1999) or increased business taxation (Die Presse, 2.10.1999). However, this strategy can be 
a double-edged sword as it to some extent may delegitimize the previously mentioned statement 
that reform is not necessary. Nonetheless, it negates that privatization is necessary. Carefully 
crafted ways of paradigm defence which I call “deconstruction” were used 3 times in the data. 
Agnes Streissler, economist at the chamber of labour and daughter of the previously mentioned 
Erich Streissler, heavily attacked the arguments of her father in a follow-up article. She lists many 
of the implicit assumptions (black boxing) which her father has made and carefully explains them 
concerning the methodology of quoted studies applied as well as the data which those studies are 
based on (Die Presse, 29.9.1999). Alois Guger, chief economist of the Wifo (Die Presse, 
2.10.1999) and Peter Merkl (Die Presse, 3.10.1999) also try to deconstruct such implicit 
assumptions.  
Proponents of the hegemonic discourse also use dramatization or strategies of reducing trust in 
private pension provision, overall 9 times in the data.  
In a discussion organized by the Federation of Industry, Schüssel has – not for the first time 
– proposed a comprehensive pension reform in the next legislature period. Public basic 
provision, private provision and occupational provision have to coexist with equal rights 
side-by-side. The SPÖ would “hysterically fight” against such a plan, so the vice chancellor. 
Consequently, the SPÖ’s general secretary Andreas Rudas warned that such plans would 
lead to “dramatic pension cuts”. (Die Presse, 16.9.1999) 
This is also clearly visible in the wording of the actors. A three pillar model is also often directly 
associated with pension cuts in such strategies (Die Presse, 16.9.1999) – a statement which of 
course also rests on a certain set of implicit assumptions (black boxing) like voluntary provision, 
low contribution rates, low public participation, and therefore coverage gaps. An already proposed 
reform of the severance pay scheme towards pension provision is framed as an “elimination” of the 
severance pay scheme (Die Presse, 16.9.1999).  An event which may also have had a negative 
effect on trust in private pensions and capital funding is the publicly circumvented bankruptcy of an 
occupational pension fund. This event triggered a series of follow-up articles, which depicted the 
bankruptcy as an outcome of its mismanaged transformation from pay-as-you-go to capital funding 
(Die Presse, 11.9.1999). Not only may have occupational pension funds therefore been 
delegitimized and presented as irresponsible and uncontrollable, but also was the difficulty of 
changing the mode of financing from pay-as-you-go towards capital funding highlighted.  
Finally, a strategy which can be described as “diversion through acceptance” was identified 6 times 
in the data. It is another double-edged sword: the respective actor has to “acknowledge” the 
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importance of private pension provision. But this acknowledgment is also relativized, while the 
importance of public pension provision is highlighted.  This on the one hand allows the actor to 
quickly bypass any opposite strategies emphasizing the necessity of pension privatization without 
appearing as irresponsible or ignorant while still granting the opportunity to highlight the 
importance of public pension schemes. A perfect example is an indirectly quoted statement by 
chancellor Viktor Klima (SPÖ) in reaction to Rürup’s criticism. 
Responding to Rürup’s assessment that pensions will have to be cut, the chancellor argued 
in the TV-discussion that this would be “wrong”. Of course, he added, are public pensions 
[only] going to suffice for insuring pension provision for people with average income. 
Occupational and individual private provision of course has to be used by people with 
higher income. (Die Presse, 27.9.1999) 
Through to some extent accepting Rürup’s statement (highlighting the relative importance of 
private provision in some cases), Klima is able to quickly surpass an “expert’s” opinion and lay 
emphasis on the importance and well-functioning of public pension provision for the majority of the 
population.  
10 normative strategies defending public pensions could be identified in the data. The mostly used 
normative strategy is to divert attention away from all the talk about unsustainability and cutbacks 
and to frame an expansion of the pension system as socially just. In other words, it is a normative 
way of deliberate de-thematization. One new ideological repertoire introduced in the pension 
discourse is gender justice, which is used both by the SPÖ as well as the ÖVP. Of course both 
parties had a fundamentally different understanding of what gender justice is about and which 
means are necessary to achieve it, but the main point here is that both strategies go hand in hand 
with an expansion of pension expenditures (Die Presse, 26.8.1999). Of course, such “expansion 
talk” makes a possible crisis situation appear less serious – why would both of the two most 
important parties of the country talk about expansion if we couldn’t afford it?  There were also 
attempts to create an ideological repertoire of generational solidarity, to link the interests of the 
elderly with the interests of the youth. Representatives of pensioners from both ÖVP and SPÖ 
emphasized the solidarity which the elderly show towards the youth (“childcare and voluntary 
work”, Die Presse 12.7.1999) and therefore create an atmosphere of liability towards the elderly in 
which pension cutbacks seem unjust. In this light, pensioner representatives also demanded the 
inclusion of youth representatives in political decision making (Die Presse, 17.9.1999), therefore 
implicitly stating they are not the enemy. But the concept of solidarity was also used in another 
context. General director of Austria’s main association of social insurance providers skilfully used 
the opportunity of a near bankrupt occupational pension fund in September 1999 to praise the 
“solidarity-based” pay-as-you-go system. An implicit comparison to private schemes is visible here 
– public solidarity versus private self-interest and irresponsibility which lead to bankruptcy (Die 
Presse, 18.9.1999). 
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5.2.2.  The “pension gap” and the severance pay scheme of 2002: Discoursive 
struggle settled 
In Austria, a new severance pay scheme passed the parliament on the 12th of June 2002. Like 
outlined in detail in chapter 2.3.2, the scheme was now constructed as a mixture between a 
traditional severance pay scheme, where employee’s get money in the case the employment 
contract is terminated, and an occupational pension. Employees could now choose to get a pay-
out, or to leave the money in the newly created funds and use them as a supplementary pension 
later on. Like in Germany, one month before the reform passed parliament as well as one day after 
was analysed18. Ultimately, 43 articles were considered as relevant and were subject to this 
analysis. In contrast to the elections of 1999, the biggest actor group is now a political party, 
namely the ÖVP, with overall 19 mentions, directly followed by their coalition partner FPÖ with 18 
mentions – which is interesting, as the ÖVP was the junior partner in this coalition. The SPÖ is 
mentioned only 10 times in this period, experts were identified 7 times. Especially interesting is the 
strong position of the social partners in the discourse of this period, as in contrast to many other 
laws of the ÖVP/FPÖ government, the adoption of the severance pay scheme was conducted in 
the tradition of Austrian neo-corporatism (social partnership). The “social partners” as a group were 
mentioned 5 times, the trade unions were mentioned 4 times, the economic chamber 3 times and 
the chamber of labour 2 times.  
Compared to the time period before the German reform in early 2001, the new severance pay 
scheme did not produce heavy resonance in the media, which can also be seen in the 
comparatively low number of relevant articles. Generally seen, privatization and capital-funding 
were no longer on the table as policy alternatives in reforming the pension system. Only very few 
articles took up on the occupational pension part of the new severance pay scheme, mainly 
criticizing the government for not implementing a true occupational pension pillar, therefore having 
a positive attitude towards capital-funding and privatization (overall 3 articles): 
The pension system cannot be saved with a contribution rate of 1.53 percent in the 
occupational pension pillar. [...] Austria is an underdeveloped country in private as well as 
occupational pensions. Not only is the contribution rate too low: also the possibility that 
employees can get a pay-out of their saved capital at the termination of the employment 
contract is not compatible with pension provision. (Die Presse, 15.5.2002) 
Apart from those voices, the new severance pay scheme was generally considered as a success, 
but for its original role as a severance pay scheme, and not as a pillar of occupational pension 
provision like advertised by the government. Mostly normative strategies were used to promote the 
                                               
18 Keyword search was conducted according to the following keywords: Pensionsreform, Pensionsversicherung,  
Altersvorsorge, "prämienbegünstigte Zukunftsvorsorge", "prämienbegünstigte Pensionsvorsorge", Pensionssystem, 
Pensionsvorsorge, Zukunftsvorsorge, Pensionskassen, Betriebspensionen, Abfertigung, Alterssicherung, 
Kapitaldeckung, Mitarbeitervorsorgekasse, „betriebliche Vorsorgekasse”, Mitarbeitervorsorgegesetz, Mitarbeitervorsorge, 
Mehrsäulensystem. 
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scheme. As the new scheme covers all new employment contracts (in contrast to the old one), 
“equality” was the main ideological repertoire used. However, only 4 articles were found where this 
repertoire was used in connection to the pension system and the optional functionality of the 
severance pay scheme as an occupational pension pillar, like seen in the German discourse of 
2001 (chapter 5.1.3): “The new severance pay scheme will bring cash or occupational pension to 
all 3.1 million employees” (Krone, 18.5.2002). Voices criticizing the new scheme were rare in the 
analysed media, mostly referring to unrealistic interest rate goals. This comes from actors which 
are sceptical towards capital-funding as well from minister for economic affairs Bartenstein (ÖVP), 
who makes tight regulation responsible for low interest rates, which would necessitate further 
deregulation of investment criteria of the newly introduced employee provision funds. 
Nobody believes in reaching the six percent rate of return on which the reform is based. 
Even Bartenstein himself calls this number too high. And vaguely points towards a 
modernization of investment criteria in 'one or two years'." (Die Presse, 29.5.2002) 
This argument frames financial regulation as responsible for low interest rates, ultimately hurting 
the employees as they get lower severance pay (or a lower pension). Additionally, regulation is 
depicted as outdated, in contrast to “modern” deregulation, delegitimizing state intervention. The 
fact that such higher interest rates would then be a result of riskier investments, possibly leading to 
a lower payoff in the end, is neglected here. So ultimately, talks about unrealistic interest rates can 
be interpreted for or against capital-funding and therefore the severance pay reform - unless 
further elaboration is given by the discursive actors. However, Bartenstein was the only one doing 
so in the analysed articles.  
In the end, all parties agreed to the reform, which seems to be rated as a pension reform only 
secondarily by the public as well as the media. This framing is of course a double edged sword, for 
the opposition as well as the government. From the perspective of the government, this reform 
may have had the potential to act as a stepping stone, abolishing the pay-out option fully later on. 
However, this is only speculation and has never happened, even more than a decade after the 
reform. On the other hand, the low public conscience for the severance pay scheme as an 
occupational pension scheme may push a lower proportion of individuals towards actually making 
use of the pension option. The reform also gave the opposition the possibility to claim that they 
prevented further pension privatization. Those opposed to capital-funding and privatization did not 
comment the new severance pay scheme with regard to its pension provision aspects.  
Generally seen, other policy alternatives apart from privatization and capital-funding were now 
seen as suited to solve the “pension problem”. Methods of dramatization (10 occurrences) are 
often used in this time period, not differing much from statements made in the time of elections.  
What changed are the consequently proposed policy alternatives, with a reform of early retirement 
legislation and an increase of the retirement age being the most prominent ideas mentioned, 
mentioned overall 9 times in the data, mostly by experts. 
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Since the 70s, life expectancy has increased by 4 years, people enter their jobs 3 years 
later and retire 5 years earlier. Key for a pension reform is the increase of the factual 
retirement age. If we manage to increase it by 5 years, pension problems are mostly 
solved. (Die Presse, 22.5.2002) 
What is remarkable here, and differs starkly in contrast to the discourse in Germany (and partly 
also the election period in Austria), is that the increase of the retirement age is not only seen as a 
possible solution, but also as nearly sufficient to solve any financial problems of the pension 
system. This is not only a single opinion in the discourse, but seems to be widely accepted. 
Privatization and capital-funding was mentioned only 3 times as a possible policy alternative in the 
observed time period. It seems as between the election period of 1999 and this analysed period in 
2002, the discoursive struggle between those in favour and those in opposed to privatization and 
capital-funding was decided in favour of the latter.  
5.2.3.   Subsidized individual private saving plans (Prämienbegünstigte 
Zukunftsvorsorge): “Rescuing” the stock market in 2002 
The FPÖ/ÖVP government presented their attempt to create third pillar individual pensions on a 
very short notice on the 18th of September 2002 and the bill passed the parliament one day later as 
part of the thematically unrelated emergency compensation package for victims of the 2002 
flooding. Therefore, it does not come as a surprise that public discussion in the forefront of the 
reform remained relatively limited. This can also be seen in the number of relevant articles one 
month before and one day after the reform: 23 relevant articles were identified19, which is 
substantially lower than in Germany’s reform periods as well as the reform period of the Austrian 
severance pay scheme. The mostly mentioned actor in this period is the FPÖ (9 mentions), 
followed by the ÖVP (8 mentions). The social partners are altogether mentioned 6 times (with the 
economic chamber being the mostly mentioned social partner with 3 mentions). Commercial 
financial market actors like banks are present in 5 occurrences, the SPÖ in 3 and “experts” in only 
2 occurrences.  
Up to and including the 18th of September, public discussion on pension reform remained very 
limited. Most articles commented on specific regulatory details of the severance pay scheme 
reform (which make up 5 of the 23 relevant articles). However, on a few occasions, discursive 
actors already mentioned the introduction of third pillar pensions.  
In a mutual press-conference with the capital-market commissioner of the federal 
government, Richard Schenz, the president of the economic chamber Christoph Leitl was in 
                                               
19 Keyword search was conducted according to the following keywords: Hochwasser-Hilfspaket, Hochwasserhilfe, 
Hochwasserpaket, "dritte Säule", Hochwasser-Hilfe, Pensionsreform, Pensionsversicherung, Altersvorsorge, 
"prämienbegünstigte Zukunftsvorsorge", "prämienbegünstigte Pensionsvorsorge", Pensionssystem, Pensionsvorsorge, 
Zukunftsvorsorge, Pensionskassen, Betriebspensionen, Abfertigung, Alterssicherung, Kapitaldeckung, 
Mitarbeitervorsorgekasse, „betriebliche Vorsorgekasse“, Mitarbeitervorsorgegesetz, Mitarbeitervorsorge, 
Mehrsäulensystem, Hochwasserentschädigung, Konjunkturpaket, "private Vorsorge", Privatpension, prämienbegünstigt, 
prämiengefördert 
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favour of strengthening the Vienna Stock Exchange. The economic chamber wants to 
promote models which provide equity capital for businesses. Schenz was additionally in 
favour of some sort of tax exemption for stock market launches. Leitl and Schenz both 
consider the introduction of a private pension provision as a central element, where 
investment in stocks will provide liquidity to the Vienna Stock Exchange. Investment in 
domestic stocks could therefore be promoted by an Austria-fund. (Die Presse, 22.8.2002).   
This statement already shows one of the main cognitive strategies used in framing the necessity of 
third pillar pensions, namely through depicting private pensions as a way to push Austrian financial 
markets (6 occurrences). Surprisingly, the analysed articles do not mention any positive effects of 
“developed” financial markets on economic growth or even the overall welfare of the population, 
nor does it further specify what the criteria for “developed” financial markets are. Developed 
financial markets are depicted as a desirable goal without going further into detail. The main 
justification is a simple comparison to other countries, where Austria would still have a 
“underdeveloped financial market” (Minister of Finance Karl-Heinz Grasser in Die Presse, 
19.9.2002). The dominance of this strategy stands in stark contrast to any previous attempts to 
frame private pensions as necessary as well as the strategies analysed in the German discourse. 
The most important aspect is that the necessity of private pensions is not framed through referring 
to public pensions. Increased possibilities for supplementary private pensions are instead depicted 
as a “win-win situation”, as it would simultaneously push financial markets. The public system is 
not attacked here, nor is the private system depicted as being introduced to fill some sort of 
“pension gap”.  The subsidy is rather framed as an additional benefit for the population. This can 
also be seen as individual private pensions are rather compared to traditional subsidized means of 
“saving” (Bausparen, 4 occurrences), but not necessarily pension provision.  
Of course, such strategies which depicted private pensions and capital-funding as necessary due 
to the weakness of the public system were also used, but rather indirectly and not from the side of 
government actors. Other cognitive strategies apart from arguing in favour of developing capital 
markets were identified 13 times in the data.  Overall, the functionality of public pensions was 
questioned through dramatization 7 times. 
Economists rightly again and again refer to the overdue reform of public expenditures – the 
basic requirement that a country can financially empower itself to choose its own way of 
economic policy. A radical pension reform is on the top of the list. It is disgraceful how this 
topic is cowardly avoided since years. (Die Presse, 18.9.2002).  
However, the propagated solution was not necessarily a strengthening of private pensions, as only 
5 of those 7 dramatization attempts showed a specific leaning towards such policy alternatives. 
Overall, rather indirect ways of promoting private pensions were popular in this reform period. For 
example, chief of the economic research institute Wifo Helmut Kramer depicted the Netherlands as 
a paragon for the Austrian pension system, but without once mentioning the wording “private 
pensions” or a design based on three pillars (Die Presse, 20.9.2002). The latter attempt can be 
classified as scientific objectification due to its seemingly scientific and neutral international 
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comparison of the Austrian pension system. Scientific objectification, also with reference to capital 
markets and through using the alleged knowledge of “experts” happened 3 times in the observed 
period. Selective communication (mainly referring to also already known interest rate goals) 
happened 2 times. One of the few really enthusiastic articles in favour of private pensions was 
published by “Die Krone” after the bill on third pillar pensions passed parliament. 
It has to be welcomed that the government promotes the possibility to use private 
supplementary insurance with a generous premium, which is by far higher than for example 
[subsidized private savings through] Bausparen. Of course it is an election goody from the 
black-blue [right-wing] government, but a reasonable one. The creation of an individual 
private “pillar” of pension provision has been postponed in Austria through dumb Sunday-
speeches (“the pensions are save”) and ideological blinkers (“the federal subsidy has to be 
increased”) for years. Of course, the model has to be refined in detail. But in the future, it 
will also allow those with average income to top up their scarce [public] ASVG-pension.  
(Krone, 20.9.2002) 
This is a case of deliberate de-thematization where previous defences of the public pension 
system and other policy alternatives (strong public pensions and federal grants as financing) are 
quickly delegitimized through buzzwords like “ideological” without offering any specific critique.  
Normative strategies were identified in 7 occurrences. Besides from the already analysed 
ideological repertoires of “saving the welfare state” and “self-responsibility”, “equality” could be 
identified 5 times, similar to discourse on the severance pay scheme reform and the German 
discourse of 2001 on private pension provision (chapter 5.1.3). As can be seen in the end of the 
last quote, like in Germany, a subsidization of private pensions is depicted as a supplementary 
pension for all, allowing also poorer people to make use of private pension provision. That 
especially persons with lower income are unlikely to make use of private pensions due to their 
voluntary nature is again neglected here, putting “equality” before “equity”.  
Direct attacks on the new individual private pensions are rare in the analysed media, most likely 
because the government only presented their plans 1 day before voting on it in the parliament. 
However, there were voices criticizing unrealistic interest rate goals, much like in the earlier period 
before the severance pay scheme reform. This comes from actors which are increasingly sceptical 
of high interest rate promises as well as from those who regard regulation which necessitates 
exclusive investment in Austrian stocks as the problem (altogether 4 occurrences).  
Two years ago, banks, insurance companies and pension funds would have yelled "Hurrah! 
We are doing it!". Today, reaching a 4.5 interest rate per year like promised by the 
government is getting doubted in this line of business. (Die Presse, 20.9.2002) 
Therefore, such a sceptical view may indeed curb the enthusiasm for capital-funding and pension 
privatization altogether. And it reveals to the public how shaky the forecasts of those in favour of 
capital-funding and privatization are.  
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5.3.  Communicative discourse on pension reform in a comparative 
perspective  
So what can finally be said about the attempts to reframe the discourse about pension provision 
towards a more favourable appraisal of private pensions in the observed countries? Hegemonic 
discourse about pension politics was quite unchallenged in the early election campaigns of 1999 in 
Austria. According to media coverage, all parties of the political arena mostly ignored this topic in 
the beginning, with the ÖVP and the FPÖ silently proposing a reform towards a three-pillar model 
without much enthusiasm or urgency. This changed as “experts” in favour of privatization like 
Rürup or Streissler increasingly entered the public discussion. However, not only did proponents of 
private pensions face frequent resistance, but most importantly were their own attempts to frame 
discourse not coherent and consistent. While the ÖVP indeed did favour privatization according to 
their election program, they nonetheless did not stop to praise Austria’s current pension system as 
a result of their own work. This heavily challenged the picture of the dramatic situation which the 
pension system was said to experience and therefore also attempts to frame private pensions as 
an answer to such challenges. In other words, the ÖVP did indeed propose privatization but did not 
give a coherent and consistent answer to the question why this reform was needed. But the ÖVP’s 
incapability to give coherent and consistent public statements (how something is said) was only 
one side of the medal. The SPÖ firmly defended the paradigm of public pension provision 
frequently, coherently and consistently, and “experts” in favour of public pensions were able to 
reinforce this defence through deliberate deconstruction (strong opposing discoursive actor).  
Ultimately, the discoursive struggle was at its peak at the elections of 1999. This stands in stark 
contrast to Germany, were the main discoursive struggle apparently already happened before the 
election campaigns as the hegemonic discourse had already been changed in favour of 
privatization. In the months before the elections, hegemonic discourse in Germany already 
depicted reform as absolutely necessary and inevitable, determining what could be said and what 
could not be said.  Attempts for discoursive change through deliberate strategies are hardly visible, 
with nearly no actor defending the status quo (no strong opposing discoursive actors). All parties of 
the political spectrum (except the leftist PDS) were only moving within that hegemonic discourse, 
which saw the public pension system as incapable of withstanding endogenous as well as 
exogenous problems, necessitating reform. This also led to a relatively consistent and coherent 
public discourse (how something is said), independently of the discursive actors responsible for the 
respective statements. While the discourse positions of discoursive entrepreneurs vary in the 
regard in which they accepted privatization and capital-funding, they did not deny the necessity of 
those policy alternatives. Alternative ways of financing were delegitimized, while the superiority of 
private and capital-funded solutions did not stand up for discussion, they were simply accepted. 
This does not mean that there has not been any discoursive struggle in the field of pension reform. 
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However, this discoursive struggle did not have the private-public nexus at its centre but was rather 
a discussion about other aspects of pension systems, also determining what can be said about 
population policy in Germany.  
However, this lack of discourse struggle about privatization and capital-funding also means that a 
public pay-as-you-go pension system as a normatively and cognitively accepted way to provide for 
retirement already lost its hegemonic position much earlier than in the forefront of the elections. 
This means that the framing process which stabilized capital-funded and private pensions as an 
ideal in the hegemonic discourse already started much earlier than in the elections of 1998, while 
nonetheless being constantly reproduced.  What is impressive with regard to the hegemonic 
discourse in Germany is the high amount of paradigm destruction visible in the debate. While of 
course more basic strategies like dramatization also dominated, in contrast to Austria, paradigm 
destruction performed an exceptional role in Germany, in the election period as well as early 2001. 
Scientific objectification is not a fundamental part of the debate in Germany, which may point to the 
fact that it is especially important in the early phases of framing (like in the elections in Austria), in 
order to show the availability of other policy alternatives and their alleged superiority through 
international comparison and the statements of supposed “experts”. In contrast, paradigm 
destruction attacks the pension system on its fundamentals, somehow necessitating a previously 
formed awareness of problems and openness to criticism.  
This also suggests that bringing up reforms which favour systematic change just before elections 
may not be an ideal way to success. Systematic discoursive change seems to require some sort of 
a “lead time” to be successful (when something is said). However, what also results from this 
analysis is that quick and fierce resistance to attempts to change the hegemonic discourse may be 
a successful strategy to counter welfare state cutbacks. Actors opposing privatization did not 
simply ignore the issue, but actively tried to counter such attacks on the welfare state – with the 
SPÖ being the second largest actor behind “experts” even in a conservative newspaper. This 
fierce discoursive struggle in the election period of Austria and consequently this heavy resistance 
in favour of the public pension system has also influenced subsequent public opinion. The public 
as well as opposing discoursive actors could not be convinced by privatization and capital-funding 
proponents and their discoursive strategies. This can also be seen in the wide ranging protests and 
strikes leading up to subsequent reforms20. After losing the discoursive struggle in communicative 
discourse, discoursive actors in favour of privatization and capital-funding have given up their 
straight up attack on the public pension systems, which can also be seen in the relatively low 
number of relevant articles compared to the reform periods in Germany. It is most likely that 
                                               
20 Furthermore, it appears to be likely that this positive framing of public pensions in Austria as can be seen in the 
election period of 1999 was at least partially responsible for the significant protest to the original pension reform draft of 
the year 2003. Only due to this protest, pension cuts were capped, therefore taking not only a large part of the carrot (as 
seen in 2002), but also the stick away from a reform towards pension privatization.    
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coordinative discourse regained relevance in the analysed reform periods of 2002, and the nature 
of the reforms as a product of social partnership negotiations also points towards that fact. Only 
few actors still tried to frame private and capital-funded pensions as necessary in communicative 
discourse, and those now used subtler methods, as can be seen in chapter 5.2.2 and 5.2.3. Much 
like suggested by Schmidt, is seems as communicative discourse can “reframe” coordinative 
discourse in order to bring all parties back to the negotiating table (Schmidt 2002b: 172f.).  
Meanwhile in public discussion, other policy alternatives apart from privatization and capital-
funding were considered as most adequate to address alleged problems of the pension system. 
Additionally, it has now to be differentiated between those who openly frame privatization as 
necessary for the overall pension system and those who promote private pensions through 
discoursive strategies which refer to completely other topics like optimizing severance pay and 
strengthening capital markets. An open position in favour of radical reform towards capital-funding 
and privatization as a partial substitute for the public pension system now seemed to be 
unacceptable in the hegemonic discourse of Austria, and is also depicted in the far less radical 
reform of second and third pillar pensions in Austria compared to Germany. This results at least 
partially from the fierce resistance of discoursive actors against privatization, but also form the 
ÖVP’s inability to offer a coherent and consistent narrative already in the elections of 1999. In 
contrast, discourse in Germany in the reform periods in 2001 is not only a perfect continuation with 
respect to the election period in 1998. Discoursive actors even managed to create a hegemonic 
discourse which demands for more radical reforms, depicting the governments reforms as not 
sufficient and delegitimizing their efforts for privatization and capital-funding on a daily routine in 
favour of a far more wide-ranging reform, especially concerning public pension cutbacks as well as 
more liberal regulation of capital-market investment in private pensions. It was not until mid-2001 
that discourse on privatization and public pensions lost significance – apparently as this reform 
path was totally uncontested in the analysed media and did not necessitate further discussion.  
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6.  Conclusion 
In this master thesis, it was shown that ideas and discourse can indeed make a difference. The 
thorough literature review has shown that policy change in pension systems cannot fully be 
addressed by traditional explanations for social policy reform. Evidence from pension reform in the 
Bismarckian pension systems of Austria and Germany suggests that ideas and discourse can act 
as possible explanations for policy change. Not everything happens behind closed doors, even in 
corporatist, multi- actor systems. Policy entrepreneurs indeed act as discoursive actors and 
engage in the communicative discourse to promote their favoured policy ideas. Pension reform in 
Germany was not exclusively bargained behind closed doors, quickly presented to the public and 
subsequently passed parliament, as often suggested. It involved rather a long and decisive framing 
process, which could be verified through a discourse analysis of newspaper articles from the 
election period and the subsequent reforms 3 years later. In Austria, such an open attempt to 
frame communicative discourse towards privatization and capital funding was prevented by the 
SPÖ, the most prominent opposing discoursive actor, as well as by the ÖVP through inconsistent 
and incoherent discursive strategies. The subsequent reforms were of a far smaller scale 
concerning privatization and capital-funding, and framing privatization and capital-funding in a 
positive light happened only rarely in communicative discourse anymore. Therefore, discourse is 
not only influenced by discoursive actors but also influences discoursive actors and therefore 
policy entrepreneurs. As could be seen in Austria, ideas incompatible with the hegemonic 
discourse (privatization and capital-funding) have a hard standing because there are cognitively 
and normatively not accepted and will provoke decisive action by opposing discoursive actors. The 
analysed data suggests that the framing process has to begin early enough and has to be coherent 
and consistent, else opposing discoursive actors will most likely be able to defend the hegemonic 
discourse. Respectively, opposing discoursive actors can defend the hegemonic discourse through 
quick and decisive action.  
Additionally, this project has given the theory strand about ideas and discourse in social policy 
additional relevance through an innovative empirical application of those theories. Using the 
comparative method in combination with critical discourse analysis seems to be a fruitful approach 
for analysing the role of ideas in pension reform. Through comparing two countries with a very 
similar history, economic situation, institutional settings, welfare regime, as well as perceived 
demographic stress it is possible to argue in favour of a causal connection between policy reform 
and discourse. This does not mean that discourse was the sole reason for wide-ranging 
privatization in Germany. But it was one reason, and this thesis suggests that it was a decisive 
one. At the same time, critical discourse analysis has also uncovered taken-for-granted statements 
and facts as deliberate discoursive strategies, revealing that policy choices in pension reform were 
not necessarily without alternative. This offers additional explanatory power as it reveals that the 
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choice for privatization and capital-funding was not inevitable due to demographic or budgetary 
pressure, but was rather only framed this way, therefore additionally removing explanatory power 
from those factors.   
First and foremost, uncovering such practices should support citizens’ participation in the political 
decision-making process. Therefore, the results of this project also have practical significance. This 
research has not only highlighted the importance of ideas and discourse in the academic field of 
social policy, but also that certain reforms and policy alternatives are not as unavoidable as they 
are often depicted. This is not an argument against a constant reform of welfare states in order to 
adapt them to new challenges and demands. However, it is indeed a warning to accept promoted 
policies mentioned in the media without question. The promised 4 percent rate of return of the 
Riester-Rente seems to be unreachable at the moment, and hovers only marginally above 0. As of 
now (2016), the German pension system is subject to public discussion due to its comparatively 
very low replacement rate (not only in comparison to Austria). In Germany, the Austrian pension 
system is now increasingly seen as a paragon (cf. Blank et al. 2016a, 2016b). Meanwhile in 
Austria, communicative discourse is surprisingly sceptical about the domestic public pension 
system. Additionally, the Neos, a new market-liberal party in the Austrian parliament, has declared 
a reform of the pension system as one of its major topics besides education, again making use the 
same discursive strategies and promoting the same solutions of privatization and capital-funding 
as seen in the elections of 1999. Those newly re-emerging discoursive struggles are not only a 
promising subject for further research. From an emancipatory perspective, this project may also 
help the public to refrain from adopting those statements made in such discoursive struggles 
unquestioned - and therefore to prevent the Austrian system from the bitter fate of its German 
counterpart.  
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